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ABSTRACT 
 The character of modern warfare is shifting toward one of competition with peer 
adversaries, and it is important that command and control models and concepts are 
adapting as well. Given that the Marine Corps’ command and control doctrine is based 
primarily on the theories of John Boyd, it is important to examine how the 
observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop can be augmented and modified in order to 
account for the impact of technological systems. This thesis examines decision-making 
theories, command and control doctrine and theories, and the operational environment in 
order to develop a modified OODA loop that can benefit tactical decision-making while 
executing expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO). This research used the 
updated OODA loop to examine two vignettes based on EABO concepts of employment 
in order to identify command and control challenges during normal operations and in a 
denied or degraded information environment. 
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Just as the nature of war encompasses those persistent aspects of war and the 
character of war describes those attributes that change over time, the same can be said of 
command and control (C2). The nature of command and control has remained relatively 
unchanged since ancient warfare, but the character of command and control evolved as 
armies grew larger, battlefields became more dispersed and technology permeated the 
battlefield. These attributes changed once again when the Marine Corps turned its attention 
to great power rivalries and competition against peer adversaries. As such it is important 
to examine how the current character of conflict impacts the character of command and 
control.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Since the ancient Greeks, new technology has altered the character of war and thus 
commanders have adapted their C2 systems to meet these needs. As armies and battlefields 
grew larger and more complex, commanders found new ways to execute command and 
control (Van Creveld, 1987). In this tradition, technological systems continue to have an 
increasing role in the C2 process. Executing the operational concepts of the 38th 
Commandant’s Planning Guidance requires advances in information systems technology 
in order to be able to execute concepts such as Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations 
(EABO) (Berger, 2019). While the Commandant of the Marine Corps asserted that C2 will 
remain a human intensive endeavor, maturing technologies such as artificial intelligence 
(AI), machine learning (ML) and cloud computing will likely have an impact on C2 
(Berger, 2019). The mere presence of and access to data, does not necessarily mean that 
the commander has a better picture of the operational environment; in fact, it can create 
new challenges for the commander.  
The warfighting theories of John Boyd have permeated Marine Corps Doctrinal 
Publications (MCDP) to include Warfighting and Command and Control (United States 
Marine Corps, 2018a, 2018b). However, because of the rapid growth of technology, Boyd’s 
observe, orient, decide and act (OODA) loop may be insufficient, as it does not sufficiently 
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take into account the growing impact of data and information systems on the decision-
making process. This is because Boyd’s focus is on the orientation phase of the cycle, and 
pays comparatively little attention to the observation phase. One can no longer take 
observations at face value. The observation phase is growing more complicated as the 
inputs to the system come from sensors and networked information systems. These systems 
by their nature have the ability to introduce error into the system, either intentionally or 
unintentionally, which can negatively impact the decision made by the commander.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS, METHODOLOGY, AND PATH 
This research seeks to answer the following questions: 
• How can the OODA loop be modified to reflect current technology and 
operating concepts? 
• What is the impact of information systems on decision-making? 
• How do decision making models that are relevant to military operations 
address the complexities of data and information flow? 
• How can observational challenges impact decision-making in current 
operational concepts such as EABO and LOCE? 
In the spirit of Boyd’s Destruction and Creation this research analyzes C2 doctrine, 
the current operating environment, and applicable decision-making theories in order to 
synthesize them into a model that addresses the C2 challenges of the operating 
environment. Chapter II provides a review of decision-making literature in order to 
determine what concepts and models could be of use in order to transition the current 
concepts into one suitable for the environment. Chapter III examines Marine Corps C2 
doctrine as well as prominent C2 literature including an analysis of Boyd’s theories. 
Chapter IV describes the operating environment in terms of competition, EABO, and the 
C2 required for such operations. Chapter V develops the updated OODA loop. Chapter VI 
describes the vignette development and methodology. Chapter VII contains vignettes based 
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on concepts of employment for EABO utilizing the updated OODA loop to determine 
command and control challenges. 
C. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to explore how decision-making theories, models, 
and concepts that incorporate technical systems can augment Boyd’s OODA loop in order 
to better illustrate the challenges of the current operating environment. This research seeks 
to update the OODA loop to reflect the current operational environment. In doing so, the 
updated model could provide planners with a more detailed mental model as they seek to 
implement concepts such as EABO. As current operational concepts call for sensors and 
shooters to be increasingly linked, while also being heavily distributed, it is important for 
decision makers to understand how data and information flow through these complex 
networks. This research will help commanders identify situations in which the data and/or 
information on which their decisions are based, may be flawed. By identifying potential 
sources of error, this study may help system designers account these sources and 
incorporate mitigation techniques into the design. More importantly, this research can help 
identify the decision-making impacts when data and information flows exist on a spectrum 
between deluge and trickle. 
This research is not meant to be a contribution to cognitive psychology, or the body 
of work in decision-making theories. Instead, the goal of this research is to continue Boyd’s 
discourse and advance the way tactical-level decision-makers think about thinking. It is 
intended to discover how the predominant decision-making theories and concepts from the 
past 30 years can be merged into Boyd’s general theory of warfare in order to further that 
theory. The intent is to develop a model that can elucidate the impact of technological 
systems on decision-making in order to shape thinking about the current operating 
environment.  
D. DEFINITIONS 
Many of the terms throughout this research mean different things to different 
authors, and some may be used interchangeably throughout the literature and common 
parlance. In particular, terminology utilized in military publications often differs from the 
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terms utilized in cognitive psychology even though they often point to the same concept. 
Given that this research targets military decision-makers, the research will, to the extent 
possible, adjust the terminology in order to align with military terms. As such, it is 
important to first define certain terms in relation to how they will be utilized in this 
research.  
The information hierarchy (Figure 1) plays an important role in both Marine Corps 
and Naval doctrine by explaining how raw data leads to an individual’s understanding, and 
helps define several terms. At the bottom of the hierarchy is data, which is comprised of 
raw, unformatted signals. Left unaltered, data has little utility, but once data is processed 
and put in an understandable form, it becomes formatted data or information (Department 
of the Navy, 1995; United States Marine Corps, 2018b). When one integrates pieces of 
information and provides that information with some context through the act of cognition, 
one gains knowledge or comprehension. The top of the information hierarchy is 
understanding, which involves giving greater situational meaning to knowledge through 
judgement and experience. With this understanding comes the ability to project or 
anticipate the future status of a given situation The end result of this process is for a 
decision-maker to gain situational awareness from which they can make a decision.  
 
Figure 1. The information hierarchy. Source: United States Marine 
Corps (2018b). 
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This research utilizes the terms commander and decision-maker interchangeably, 
and the reader should view them as such. Due to the Marine Corps’ doctrinal view of C2, 
one of centralized command and decentralized execution, there are certain decisions a 
commander makes, and certain decisions lower level leaders are authorized to make. As 
such, the models and theories described throughout the research apply equally to 
commanders and decision-makers. This is also a recognition that the enemy, especially a 
peer, has a vote in how events unfold. As such, in warfare it may not be the commander or 
even the designated leader that is forced to make a decision. Instead, it may be the 
individual on watch, at a given time, that is forced to make a tactical-level decision with 
strategic implications.  
This research also uses the term technological system as a general term designed to 
encompass information systems (e.g. Palantir and databases), communication systems 
(e.g., e-mail, tactical chat systems, and radio communications), and weapons systems such 
as Aegis. This is an intentionally broad term in order to allow the reader to connect the 
systems with which they are familiar to the research. This allows the reader to apply the 
concepts discussed in the research to their C2 system.  
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II. A REVIEW OF DECISION-MAKING THEORIES  
Decision-making plays a critical role in C2 because it describes how a decision-
maker determines what must be done. In order to modify the OODA loop to better reflect 
the operational environment, it is necessary to review the applicable decision-making 
literature in order to update the model. Given the vast array of literature, this chapter is 
limited to reviewing the literature most applicable to tactical-level military decision-
making as it relates to the environment. This chapter reviews literature regarding 
sensemaking, situation awareness, naturalistic decision-making.  
A. SENSEMAKING AND SITUATION AWARENESS 
Weick (2008) defined sensemaking as the “ongoing retrospective of plausible 
images that rationalize what people are doing” (p. 1). In short, it is the constant process of 
observing what is occurring and attempting to make it clearer and justifiable (Weick, 2008). 
The process of sensemaking is perhaps the most important part of the decision-making 
process, because this examination of environmental cues determines the need to even make 
a decision (Weick, 2008).  
Sensemaking and situation awareness (SA) are similar concepts and for the 
purposes of this research are considered synonymous. SA is knowing what is going on 
around oneself, yet it is much more than that because one’s level of SA can impact one’s 
decision-making and their performance (Endsley, 2000). A more complete definition of 
SA is that it is the combination of “the perception of the elements in the environment within 
a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of 
their status in the near future” in relationship to one’s goals, objectives, or purpose 
(Endsley, 1995, p. 36). This definition emphasizes the importance of the temporal element, 
and yields three levels of situation awareness corresponding to perception, comprehension, 
and projection (Endsley, 2000).  
As shown in Figure 2, a variety of elements impact one’s SA. Technological 
systems effect SA through their capabilities, interface, user workload, complexity, and 
automation levels (Endsley, 1995). These elements have the capability to improve one’s 
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SA by enabling a rapid, accurate, and clear perception of the applicable data to the user. 
However, if network connectivity is degraded, causing it to operate slowly, it can be 
difficult to obtain accurate information and can lead to increased uncertainty and 
incomplete perceptions. One’s goals, objectives, preconceptions, and expectations impact 
SA by helping to drive what information is perceived and the context applied to it in order 
to comprehend and project those elements. This relates to the concepts of information-pull 
and information-push to be discussed in Chapter III. The technological system can facilitate 
SA by enabling a decision-maker to pull the pertinent information based on their 
objectives. At the same time, if organized in an information-push model, the decision-
maker could be inundated with non-applicable data forcing them to devote more time and 
resources to perceive the desired data.  
 
Figure 2. Model of situation awareness in relation to decision-
making. Source: Endsley (1995). 
As Endsley (2000) and Weick (2008) indicated, an individual can have a high-level 
of SA and still make a poor decision. Likewise, one can have a lower-level of SA, and 
make what turns out to be a good decision. Thus, while there is a link between SA and 
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decision-making, the relationship is not coupled (Endsley, 2000). This is similar to Boyd’s 
concept of orientation, so it could be said that one’s SA drives the need to make a decision 
as well as what that decision may be. 
Level 1 SA refers to one’s perception of data elements and cues in the environment. 
One’s perception of the environment is formed from all of the information sources 
available to an individual, whether it is through direct observation or through indirect 
observations as is the case with information systems (Endsley, 2000). As such, information 
systems can facilitate Level 1 SA by making more information available to the user; 
however, it can also hinder Level 1 SA by providing too much information such that the 
operator misses the pertinent information. An individual’s goals impact perception because 
it can determine what data are sought (top-down processing) as well as act as a filter for 
what environmental data/cues are received (bottom-up processing) (Endsley, 2000). 
Recalling the Chapter I working definition of information as formatted data, Level 1 SA is 
impacted by the information-based problems of missing, unreliable, superfluous, or 
complex information which will discussed in Chapter III. For example, if a large amount 
of applicable information was unavailable due to emission control (EMCON) restrictions, 
it could limit one’s ability to perceive the environment thus impacting Level 1 SA. 
Level 2 SA refers to one’s comprehension of the current situations based on the 
synthesis of Level 1 elements (Endsley, 1995, 2000). In other words, context is applied to 
the elements to derive meaning from them (Klein, 2000). One’s comprehension of the 
situation is based on the synthesis of the Level 1 elements; however, that process is driven 
by the individual’s mental model. One’s goals impact the manner in which one provides 
meaning and context to data because those goals impact the mental model applied to the 
data.  
Level 3 SA refers to the ability to project the future status of those perceived 
elements (Endsley, 1995). Once again, an individual’s mental model drives what they 
perceive to be the future status. As one would expect, the accuracy of this projection is 
based not only on the validity of the mental model, but also how far in the future they 
attempt to project the future status based on the mission or task duration. This projection 
is what essentially drives the need to make a decision.  
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Mental models and active goals play a critical role in the development of SA as 
shown in Figure 3. One’s active goal helps drive the selection of a mental model, and based 
on that mental model, the individual can direct their attention towards certain cues that 
allow them to perceive data relevant to their goals. The mental model also allows the 
individual to compare their perceptions to what they should see based on their mental 
model. The model also allows helps provide context to the data allowing an individual to 
comprehend its status and project its future status (Endsley, 2000). For example, one could 
have a mental model for what they should see from an adversary H-6J aircraft on a routine 
(non-threatening) flight, and a failure to see those cues could indicate that the flight is not 
routine. 
 
Figure 3. Impact of mental models on SA. Source: Endsley (2000). 
As previously mentioned, the temporal aspect of situational awareness is critical in 
understanding how it impacts decision-making. SA must be understood within the context 
of how much time, be it perceived or actual, is available until some event occurs or some 
action must be taken that would impact their goals (Endsley, 2000). 
B. DUAL-SYSTEM DECISION-MAKING AND HEURISTICS AND BIASES 
In the dual-system model of decision-making there are two types of processes at 
work. System 1 (sometimes referred to as type 1) refers to fast and intuitive decision-
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making, and System 2 (sometimes referred to as type 2) refers to slower more reflective 
decisions (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). As Kahneman (2013) described, when one 
encounters a problem with which they are familiar or one in which they can distill into a 
simpler one, the mind typically utilizes System 1 thinking; however, when faced with an 
unfamiliar problem with no heuristic comparison the mind utilizes System 2 processes. 
System 1 functions automatically with very little effort or sense of control on behalf 
of the decision-maker and in some respects may be thought of as autonomous (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2013). As such, these situations do not require the use of 
working memory and do not constitute a significant cognitive burden (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013). A simple way to think about System 1 is that it is designed to arrive at a conclusion 
with little effort, utilizing very little evidence (Kahneman, 2013). System 1 is able to do 
this through the use of heuristics, which are mental shortcuts that reduce more complex 
problems or situations into simpler ones enabling System 1 to handle the decision-making 
process (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
System 2 operates largely in the background and monitors the operation of System 
1, essentially endorses the operations of System 1 (Evans, 2008). In the event System 1 
recognizes a situation that is too complex for it to handle, System 2 takes over providing a 
more in-depth, rules-based, conscious analysis process (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Kahneman, 2013). 
Challenging and complex situations require the in-depth analysis provided by 
System 2; however, in order for System 2 to activate it must recognize the difficulty of the 
problem (Kahneman, 2013). Evans (2008, p. 266) put it succinctly, “Heuristic judgments, 
which lead to biases, are associated with System 1, and analytic reasoning, which may 
intervene with these judgments and improve them, are linked to System 2.” The challenge 
with this is that those heuristic judgments may mask the need for System 2 to operate, yet 
the time constraints of combat and agile systems may necessitate System 1 time scales. In 
other words, System 1 can cause a flawed sense of intuition and mischaracterize the 
problem or situation (Kahneman, 2013). Kahneman (2013) proposed the solution to this is 
to attempt to recognize situations requiring greater cognitive input and force oneself to 
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think deeper about the issue. In short, one needs to catch themselves before jumping to a 
conclusion. 
Not only can heuristics trick the mind into thinking issues are simpler than they are, 
the comparison they yield can be biased. These are not malicious biases or ones that are 
predicated towards a specific outcome or goal. Rather, they are an inherent part of heuristic 
comparisons (Kahneman, 2013). For example, the availability heuristic makes 
comparisons based off of the preponderance of examples in recent memory (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Returning to the previous example of the H-6J, if every day for the past 
month that same aircraft flew the same route without any hostile acts, one would be biased 
towards concluding that the current H-6J would follow the same pattern in the absence of 
further information.  
Likewise, the representative heuristic seeks to classify something based on how 
representative of the classification it is (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Applied to this 
scenario, in the absence of definitive information, System 1 would seek to classify the 
aircraft as based on of the number of hostile characteristics exhibited. In this scenario, the 
aircrafts airspeed, altitude, direction, and emissions could indicate that it is hostile, so one 
may be biased towards concluding that it is hostile. This is particularly dangerous because 
while the aircraft could be exhibiting hostile attributes, its intent could be to harass U.S. 
forces.  
The primary risk of heuristic-based decisions are the problems stemming from 
“intuitive judgments that arise from simplifying heuristics” (Kahneman & Klein, 2009, p. 
519) The nature of the dual-systems and heuristics can lead to a false sense of 
understanding the situation (illusion of understanding), and a false sense of confidence in 
that understanding (illusion of validity). The sense-making ability of System 1 makes 
individuals “see the world as more tidy, simple, predictable, and coherent than it really is,” 
which leads to the illusion of understanding (Kahneman, 2013, p. 204). Likewise, System 
1 and System 2 construct a coherent narrative to describe the environment. Because the 
narrative is coherent and formed by the information at one’s disposal and one’s own beliefs, 
an illusion of validity can develop from this unjustified confidence in the judgement 
(Kahneman, 2013; Kahneman & Klein, 2009). Each of these illusions can contribute to a 
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SA or orientation that does not align with the true environment, which in turn can impact 
the final decision made and subsequent action taken. Technological systems can contribute 
to these illusions through a false sense of understanding the environment. Systems can 
provide more cues from which to make heuristic comparisons, but that does not necessarily 
mean those comparisons will be accurate. 
Due to the vast amount of data made available by information systems, individuals 
often utilize heuristics to cope with information overload and uncertainty (Metzger et al., 
2010). The same mental shortcuts and information-processing strategies can also be 
applied to determine what data are perceived and considered by an individual (Gugerty & 
Link, 2020; Metzger et al., 2010). One way to do this is to view only credible and relevant 
information based on the situation. While there are many heuristics that can be employed, 
some of the important ones for evaluating data credibility are: reputation of the source, 
endorsement of the source (also known as conferred credibility), consistency of the 
information with other sources, and whether the information differs from what was 
expected (Metzger et al., 2010). Relevancy can typically be controlled by search 
parameters and filters dictated by the individual’s task (Shattuck & Miller, 2006).  
While these heuristic approaches are necessary to filter through large amounts of 
information, it is important to note that heuristic biases are also present. For example, it is 
possible for a highly trusted and reputable source to provide inaccurate information. If the 
information is accepted and used to form an opinion based on the credibility of the source 
rather than an objective accuracy of the data, one invites the myriad problems associated 
with making such a flawed decision. Thus, once again, the risk of heuristic-based decisions 
stems from the simplification provided by that judgement (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). 
As will be seen in Chapter III both systems are present, in the OODA loop. In 
Boyd’s OODA loop (Figure 8) the implicit guidance and control arrow from orientation to 
action represents System 1 operations. In these cases the individual is able to quickly 
determine an action without further analysis. System 2 is embedded in the loop when an 
individual continues the orientation process, analyzes decisions and perhaps moves 
through multiple iterations prior to reaching a decision and action. From this, one could 
conclude that System 1 operations allow for a faster decision-making tempo and can help 
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one operate inside an adversary’s OODA loop. While this may be true in certain 
circumstances, it also means that such decisions are based on quick heuristic-based 
judgements, which may not be desirable against a thinking adversary.  
The complicated environment described in Chapter V makes these types of 
judgements dangerous due to adversary deception, the nature of competition, and OIE 
(United States Marine Corps, 2020). The previously mentioned H-6J may simply be trying 
to impose costs on U.S. forces to devote the time, resources, and stress to determine the 
intentions of the aircraft and potentially bait the stand-in force to take an overly aggressive 
action against the aircraft. Such an action could be used to bolster Chinese support, 
domestically and internationally, for their actions while making the U.S. look like the 
aggressor. It is therefore critical that the stand-in forces recognize when they are making a 
heuristic-based judgement and attempt to analyze the situation to the extent possible given 
the time constraints (Kahneman, 2013). It is also important that the stand-in forces 
incorporate aspects of deception into their thinking to help trigger further analysis (Brown, 
2016).  
C. NATURALISTIC DECISION-MAKING 
The study of naturalistic decision-making (NDM) focuses on how individuals make 
decisions in their actual environment as opposed to laboratory settings. Classical views of 
decision-making focused on decisions made in relatively well-defined and static 
environments where the focus could be on a single decision-point, such as a business 
merger (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993). Naturalistic decision-making focuses on settings that 
are much more applicable to military operations, including decisions made by experienced 
decision-makers making high-stakes decisions in environments containing: ill-structured 
problems, dynamic conditions, uncertainty, shifting/competing goals, and time constraints 
(Klein, 2017; Orasanu & Connolly, 1993). Thus, the operational environment as described 
in Chapter V is a naturalistic setting for those decision-makers executing EABO. Like the 
iterative nature of the OODA loop, decisions made in naturalistic settings are one decision 
in a string of actions that comprise an entire event, thus it is an iterative process containing 
various feedback loops (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993). Part of the goal of NDM was to 
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demystify the concept of intuition by examining the cues utilized by experienced decision-
makers to form their judgment and describe tacit knowledge (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). 
NDM is concerned about the decisions made by experts within their realm of 
expertise as would be the case with a ship’s captain, military commander, or stand-in force 
decision-maker. This is because decision-makers in these situations rely heavily on their 
experience in order to make decisions. According to Klein (2017), intuition allowed 
experienced decision-makers to match patterns in the data/cues they receive with their 
experiences in order to judge the typicality of the situation. In many respects, it is analogous 
to Boyd’s use of fingerspitzengefuhl. This fingertip-feel allows commanders and other 
experienced decision-makers to quickly size-up a situation and determine whether it is one 
in which they are familiar or unfamiliar (Brown, 2018). Through pattern matching, an 
individual is able to test the alignment between expected and perceived cues, which allows 
them to adapt accordingly to anomalies. Additionally, Klein (2009, 2017) believed 
experienced individuals were more capable of conducting mental simulations in order to 
project the future status of the cues.  
According to Klein (2009), one’s ability to judge typicality is based on whether 
they have an appropriate mental model for the given situation, which is linked with 
experience. If the individual is familiar with the situation, they possess a mental model for 
that type of scenario and would be able to judge the relevant cues, expectancies, goals and 
potential actions based on that model. If the individual is not familiar with the situation, 
they attempt to construct a model based on what experiences they do have and by seeking 
more data (Klein, 2009).  
Experience is important in NDM because many aspects of the process are driven 
by tacit knowledge. Klein (2009) described tacit knowledge as encompassing attributes 
such as perceptual skills, the ability to develop workarounds, pattern matching ability, the 
ability to judge typicality, and the variety and robustness of mental models (Klein, 2009). 
As one gains experience, they add to these knowledge capabilities, which is beneficial 
when making decisions. Novice decision-makers possess limited amounts of tacit 
knowledge. If put in a situation where they are making a decision, they have less tacit 
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knowledge to draw upon in order to analyze the situation and make a decision (Klein, 
2017).  
As shown in Figure 4, formulating a decision takes both explicit and tacit 
knowledge; however, tacit knowledge is often more difficult to describe and harder to 
procure (Klein, 2009). One can see this relationship when learning to ride a bike, drive a 
car, or fly a helicopter. Through explicit knowledge, one can understand what they are 
supposed to do; however, actually doing it is another story. It takes time to build the tacit 
knowledge required to balance on a bicycle, make a safe left turn in a car, or to hover a 
helicopter. It takes experience in these fields to develop the ability to perceive the 
applicable cues, match them to something they know, judge what is going on, and make 
corrections.  
 
Figure 4. Explicit and tacit knowledge. Source: Klein (2009). 
While there are a variety of different models of NDM based on the specific 
application, one of the most prominent is the recognition-primed decision (RPD) as seen 
in Figure 5. As the name indicates, this model is predicated on experienced individuals 
being able to recognize decisions that require some action. The model takes into account 
two important aspects of NDM: how the decision-maker observes and orients upon the 
situation and how they evaluate each option (Klein, 2017). This model focuses on how 
17 
decision-makers assess the situation rather than the generation and comparison of decisions 
(Klein, 1993). Like the orientation phase of the OODA loop and SA, the focus is on the 
cognitive processes that facilitate a decision.  
Figure 5 represents three variations of the RPD that could occur in a given situation. 
Variation 1 is the simplest variation, and explains what happens when a decision-maker 
faces a situation with which they are familiar. In this case the decision-maker experiences 
environmental cues and they are able to recognize the situation, match it with a resident 
mental model. The mental model of the situation helps determine relevant cues, cues they 
expect to see, their goals in the situation, and their course of action. Because it is a simple 
situation with which they are familiar, they are able to swiftly implement a course of action 
(Klein, 2017). In relation to the two-system (or dual process) model, this is analogous to 
System 1 functions. Variation 1 is similar to the previous example of the H-6J flying on a 
routine route. The cues from the environment indicate this is a typical event and the cue 
align with what is expected. 
  
Figure 5. Recognition-primed decision model. Source: Klein (2017). 
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In Variation 2, the situation is more complex and the decision-maker may not be 
able to immediately diagnose the situation, so they need to analyze the situation in order to 
comprehend it. In this case, System 2 is activated and the decision-maker attempts to match 
the events in such a way that they are able to find a mental model, or merge multiple 
models, in order to accurately describe the situation. The decision-maker may also run 
through a mental simulation in order to help diagnose the situation. The decision-maker 
also uses mental simulation to generate expectancies that are used to constantly verify the 
validity of their diagnosis. If there is an anomaly, they try and clarify their diagnoses of the 
situation and gain more data in order to clarify the situation (Klein, 2017).  
If instead of a single H-6J aircraft, Variation 2 could be illustrated by the cues 
indicating multiple H-6Js with fighter escorts. This would be an atypical event and the 
decision-maker would attempt to match various cues with other mental models to form a 
composite model and build a narrative of the event. Eventually they arrive at an 
understanding of the situation that while this is a larger formation, they still exhibit 
characteristics of a routine flight and no action would be required. 
Variation 3 involves evaluating courses of action. Based on their experience, the 
decision-maker arrives at one or more potential actions. At this point, the decision-maker 
does not run through every option analytically or construct some sort of matrix to evaluate 
the options. Instead, they simulate the first option and determine if it will work. If the option 
works but requires modification, the changes are made and it is re-simulated. If the action 
will not work, they simulate the next option. If no options work, they will typically re-
evaluate the problem. The key in NDM is that decision-makers are engaging in satisficing. 
They are not looking for the optimal or ideal solution, because the circumstances may not 
allow for such analytics. Instead, they are looking for the first solution that will work 
(Orasanu & Connolly, 1993).  
In each of these variations, after the selected course of action is taken, the decision-
maker observes the environment for cues to dictate follow-on actions (Orasanu & 
Connolly, 1993). This reflects the cyclical nature of NDM and reflects the feedback loops 
in the OODA loop as well as the concept of command and feedback.  
19 
Concepts of the dual-system approach and Boyd are present in NDM as depicted 
by the RPD. The black-filled portions of Figure 5 are largely System 1 functions and 
Boyd’s implicit guidance and control leading to action. For example, in Variation 1 the 
decision-maker is able to rapidly move from cue to implementation rapidly with little effort 
and without the analysis to provide an immediate justification (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). 
On the other hand, in Variation 2 and Variation 3, the decision-maker’s System 2 must 
interject in order to analyze the situation and action options respectively. This illustrates 
that the two systems are not mutually exclusive but can operate on a continuum as dictated 
by the situation (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). In terms of the OODA loop, the situation 
necessitates a more robust orientation and perhaps multiple iterations of a hypothesis.  
Both NDM and the dual-system approach rely on the intuition of the decision-
maker; however, they differ in what forms intuition. NDM posits that intuition stems from 
experience and tacit knowledge that one gains over time (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). An 
individual can apply this to various situations with which they are familiar. However, if 
one does not have the requisite experience to accurately recognize the problem, then that 
decision can be flawed (Klein, 1993). The dual-system approach posits that intuition stems 
from the ability to utilize simplifying heuristics to solve a problem thus allowing System 1 
to resolve the problem (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). However, if this simplification is an 
incorrect characterization of the problem, once again the decision can be flawed. Thus, 
both theories can yield accurate and inaccurate decisions based on the individual, 
experience level, and their amount of tacit knowledge. 
The concepts of NDM apply to EABO particularly because of the environment and 
the experience levels of the stand-in force. Given that the operational environment fits the 
definition of a naturalistic setting, the concepts of NDM provide another way to examine 
decision-making in this environment. One of the important take-aways is the importance 
of the decision-maker to extract cues from the environment. This is similar to Boyd’s 
observation phase, and the perceptions of Level 1 SA. Applied to the operational 
environment, most of a decision-maker’s cues will come from technological systems. Thus 
their ability to recognize a situation based on those cues is dependent on the attributes of 
the system to clearly and swiftly provide the necessary cues. If the system provides too 
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many cues, the decision-maker may be inundated by information and unable to identify the 
salient cues. If the cues are insufficient or incorrect, it could cause the decision-maker’s 
perception of reality to differ from the actual environment. Additionally, one of the 
challenges in this environment can be the decision-maker’s desire to obtain continuously 
more information. In this case, the desire for more information is not to recognize the 
situation or determine an outcome, but rather to make them feel more comfortable with 
their decision or proposed course of action. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter examined a variety of sensemaking and decision-making models that 
are applicable to tactical decision-making in the given operational environment. Many 
concepts resident in these theories applied and reinforced concepts described by Boyd to 
include the importance of the orientation phase, the use of mental models, and the 
importance on the temporal aspect of decision-making. Central to these theories was some 
element of perception, comprehension, and projection that drove the need to make a 
decision as well as what decision could be made.  
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III. A REVIEW OF COMMAND AND CONTROL CONCEPTS 
AND DOCTRINE 
What is command and control? As defined by the DOD Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, command and control (C2) is “the exercise of authority and direction by 
a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment 
of the mission” (Department of Defense, 2021). Hughes and Girrier (2018, p. 335) defined 
command and control as “the command organization, along with decisions made by and 
actions directed by the commander to employ force, counter-force, scouting, and anti-
scouting resources to accomplish an objective.” As one can imagine, the variations of this 
definition are quite varied to the extent that some authors, such as Vassiliou et al. (2014) 
devoted appendices to the varying definitions. In fact, command and control can mean 
almost anything to anyone; from simple radio communications to using the most advanced 
sensing and tracking systems (Coakley, 1992). Such varying definitions tend to mask the 
nature and character of C2.  
This chapter examines the nature and character of C2 as viewed through the lens of 
the Marine Corps’ doctrinal definition of C2, the challenges to C2, and prominent C2 
models. In doing so, this chapter lays the foundation for the ensuing analyses of the 
operational environment and decision-making theories.  
A. NATURE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6 (MCDP 6) defined command and control as 
the “means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that 
appropriate actions are taken” (United States Marine Corps, 2018b, p. 1-4). As such, 
command and control is a process during which the commander seeks to make sense of a 
given situation, determine a course of action, and direct their assets accordingly, which 
aligns with the definition provided by Hughes and Girrier (2018). These definitions 
recognize what the Department of Defense (DOD) definition above does not: that C2 
encompasses an element of decision-making and is thus an inherently human activity 
(Coakley, 1992). Herein lies the nature of command and control. 
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C2 can be further codified by separating it into its components. Command is simply 
the exercise of authority that must be exercised nearly continuously (United States Marine 
Corps, 2018b; Van Creveld, 1987). The Marine Corps executes this by utilizing a system 
of centralized command and decentralized execution. This enables the authority of the 
commander to be constantly applied through their commander’s intent. This means that 
commanders tell their forces what needs done, and leave it to subordinate leaders to 
determine how to carry it out. This is known as mission-type orders. In this sense, the most 
important part of an order is the commanders intent: their vision for the operation. This 
provides the common ground and intent through which subordinates can execute their 
tasks. By its nature, this forces the commander to relinquish some control in the traditional 
sense; however, it allows subordinates to exercise initiative. The foundation for this is trust 
in subordinate leaders. 
Builder et al. (1999) expanded this idea by describing command concepts as the 
commander’s vision of a military operations. A command concept contained all the 
necessary information and direction that subordinates would need in order to execute the 
mission, and is more robust than the idea of commander’s intent. Through this concept, 
Builder et al. (1999) postulated that communication during a military operation could be 
minimized and limited to modifying and/or verifying the command concept. Thus 
operations that required a tremendous amount of communications with the commander was 
indicative of a poor concept, and minimal communications demonstrated a robust 
command concept (Builder et al., 1999). 
Traditionally, control is seen as a unidirectional, top-down process. In this model, 
the commander determines the actions to be taken and controls their forces in order to carry 
out the actions. Given the nature of warfare and the character of distributed operations, it 
is a fallacy to believe that a commander can control their forces precisely like chess pieces. 
As depicted in Figure 6, the Marine Corps views command as the same top-down function; 
however, it views control as a feedback mechanism that allows the commander to 
determine if their decisions have the desired effect (United States Marine Corps, 2018b). 




Figure 6. Two views of the relationship between command and 
control. Source: United States Marine Corps (2018b). 
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS 
A C2 system is the combination of organizational considerations, personnel, 
information, technical means, and procedures that work together to enable the C2 process 
(Coakley, 1992; Department of Defense, 2021; United States Marine Corps, 2018b; Van 
Creveld, 1987). As described, technological systems represent only part of this complex 
system. Boyd’s lectures (2018) and more recently Brose’s analysis (2020) described an 
environment within the DOD where technology was seen as a panacea, and that applying 
technology and more exquisite systems would alleviate the problems of decision-making 
on the battlefield. In reality, the elements of the C2 systems are symbiotic. Changes or 
advances in one category without due considerations to the others can not only negate any 
benefits from the changes, but can stall the C2 process. Thus, advances in technological 
systems alone cannot solve the problems of C2, but rather those advances need to be 
combined with changes in organizational structures, procedures, and personnel in order to 
fully leverage the capabilities of the human-machine team.  
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C. COMMAND AND CONTROL CHALLENGES 
Given that C2 is perhaps the most important single activity in warfare, disrupting 
C2 is a cost effective way to challenge adversaries (Hoehn et al., 2021). The two most 
important challenges to C2 are uncertainty and time. Decision-makers must contend with 
and balance the issues of uncertainty and time, because in many ways, command and 
control is, in part, an endless quest for the necessary level of certainty (Schmitt & Klein, 
1996; United States Marine Corps, 2018b; Van Creveld, 1987). This quest is constrained 
by time (Fadok, 1995; Lawson, 1981; United States Marine Corps, 2018b; Van Creveld, 
1987). As Schmitt and Klein (1996) described, uncertainty can stem from friendly, enemy, 
and environmental issues, which can be exacerbated by perceived or actual time 
constraints.  
1. Uncertainty 
Schmitt and Klein described uncertainty as “what [one] does not know or 
understand about a given situation” (1996, p. 63). While this is perhaps an oversimplified 
working definition, it is useful in the context of this research, and is important because 
uncertainty can prevent a decision-maker from making a decision and taking action at the 
required time. This fog-of-war can be the commander’s (or decision-maker’s) primary 
challenge in understanding the environment and determining what must be done (Paul et 
al., 2018). 
This research utilizes uncertainty as an umbrella term to describe the issues of 
information uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity, and equivocality. These issues can be 
divided into information-based and knowledge-based issues as depicted in Figure 7 (Zack, 
2007).1 As described by Zack (2007), information uncertainty and complexity are 
information-based problems because they arise from issues regarding the data and 
information itself. Ambiguity and equivocality are knowledge-based issues because the 
issue is not with the data or information. Instead, an individual has difficulties achieving a 
sense of comprehension or understanding of the situation. 
 
1 Zack (2007) refers to these as problems of knowing. 
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Figure 7. Elements of uncertainty. Adapted from Klein (1996) and 
Zack (2007). 
Information uncertainty relates to the fog-of-war that stems from missing, 
unreliable, and superfluous information (Paul et al., 2018; Schmitt & Klein, 1996; Zack, 
2007). Information is considered missing if it is not available when required by the 
decision-maker. This could occur if the required data was never collected, or if the data is 
unavailable due to problems accessing data (Schmitt & Klein, 1996). Information is 
unreliable when the source credibility of the data is low, or if the data may be outdated 
(Schmitt & Klein, 1996). As Buchler et al. (2016) and Marusich et al. (2016) concluded, 
this involves not only trusting the information, but whom within the C2 organization shares 
that information. Finally, it is possible to have too much information. In this case, there is 
simply too much information and an individual reaches the limits of their cognitive 
capacity resulting in an of information-fog. Information uncertainty problems make it 
difficult, if not impossible, to gain an understanding of a given situation, which in turn 
limits the soundness of any decision derived from that understanding (United States Marine 















As described by Zack (2007), complexity refers to a large number of parts that 
interact in a non-simple manner. Complexity issues arise when one has difficulty 
integrating disparate data from various sources in order to reach an understanding. Modern 
military operations are inherently complex, as they integrate multiple domains while being 
geographically dispersed (Van Creveld, 1987). This can take the form of poor 
interoperability between systems which force the human to piece together disparate 
information from various systems.  
Ambiguity stems from the “inability to interpret or make sense of something” based 
on the available information, meaning that one may lack the experience or contextual 
background in order to effectively interpret the information (Zack, 2007, p. 1666). Thus, 
one can resolve ambiguity by reframing the information, gaining more contextual or 
explanatory knowledge, or by utilizing another’s interpretation (Zack, 2007).  
Equivocality is the opposite of ambiguity and exists when there are multiple 
interpretations of the same thing (Zack, 2007). In this instance, individual unambiguous 
interpretations may conflict with each other, and can potentially be caused by conflicting 
data. Once again, the solution to the equivocality problem is to confer with others in order 
to remedy the varying interpretations, and arrive at a common understanding.  
Based on a study of Marine Corps regimental C2, Schmitt and Klein (1996) found 
that nearly 50 percent of all cases of uncertainty stem from knowledge-based problems. As 
such, this is not a problem that can be resolved by gaining more information, but rather an 
issue requiring additional context or additional interpretations. In other words, ambiguity 
can be mitigated to an extent by those with sufficient experience or by collaborating with 
others (Katz, 2019).  
There are two methods to cope with uncertainty: attempt to decrease uncertainty, 
or embrace uncertainty (Canan & Soykan, 2016; United States Marine Corps, 2018b). 
Conceptually, resolving uncertainty is a combination of both accepting some level of 
uncertainty while trying to decrease it to a manageable level. Thus, increasing the amount 
of available information does not necessarily lead to reduced information uncertainty 
(Buchler et al., 2016; Marusich et al., 2016). 
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2. Time 
Each of the previously mentioned challenges has a temporal aspect with which 
decision-makers must contend. For example, in a short period of time, a decision-maker 
may not be able to gather more data and information in order to cope with information 
uncertainty. Likewise, that time constraint can limit their ability to piece together the 
disparate information resulting from complexity. Time can also prevent decision-makers 
from consulting with others in order to remedy issues of ambiguity and equivocality.  
Time is perhaps the greatest constraint in resolving uncertainty. In combat 
situations, the amount of time available is often outside of the decision-maker’s control. 
There are many situations where the adversary dictates how much time one has in order to 
make a decision, as would be the case when contending with an inbound aircraft. Fleeting 
opportunities can also limit the amount of time a decision-maker has to contend with these 
issues, as the opportunity may no longer exist after a given amount of time. Finally, friendly 
operations can act as a time constraint as well. If there is a mission on a timeline, a decision-
maker only has a certain amount of time in order to make a decision or risk throwing of the 
timeline of the entire mission, which can have rippling effects should the mission involve 
several different air assets.  
D. JOHN BOYD AND THE OODA LOOP 
Boyd’s general theory of war was instrumental in the development of maneuver 
warfare and Marine Corps warfighting doctrine (Brown, 2018). As such, Marine Corps C2 
doctrine is also heavily influenced by Boyd’s Organic Design for Command and Control. 
This section describes Boyd’s theories as they apply to C2, and examine their shortfalls 
based on how C2 functions today. 
Boyd believed that, “we must be able to form mental concepts of observed reality, 
as we perceive it, and be able to change these concepts as reality itself appears to change” 
in order to make timely decisions (Boyd, 1976, p. 2). This means that individuals must be 
able to form and modify mental models in order to cope with complexities and uncertainties 
in order to understand the environment (Boyd, 1976). These mental models guide one’s 
perception of how the world works and therefore influence how one thinks and operates 
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(Senge, 2006). In other words, mental models help provide context to one’s perceptions. 
This aligns with the concepts of mental models discussed in Chapter II 
In order to explore this idea, Boyd utilized a scientific trinity that drove the 
preponderance of his thoughts: Kurt Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, Werner 
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, and the Second Law of Thermodynamics (Boyd, 
1976). From Gödel, Boyd found that in order to validate a concept, there existed a constant 
cycle between making observations to sharpen the concept, and then using that concept to 
refine subsequent observations (Boyd, 1976). If such inward-oriented validation continued, 
it would only expose more uncertainties and create more entropy in accordance with 
Heisenberg and the Second Law of Thermodynamics respectively (Boyd, 1976). An 
increase in information caused entropy levels to increase, which made it necessary to break 
down the current mental model in order to create a new mental model, such is the essence 
of destruction and creation and the OODA loop. Putting it more concisely, Fadok stated, 
“one cannot determine the nature and character of a system within itself and, furthermore, 
any attempts to do so will lead to greater disorder and confusion” (1995, p. 14).  
Boyd’s OODA loop is the manifestation of this synthesis. At a basic level, the 
OODA loop, as depicted in Figure 8, illustrates the ability to observe reality, formulate a 
perception of that reality, and use that perception to make decisions and act on those 
decisions. As the cycle continues, new observations enter the loop, which enable one to 
break down previous perceptions of reality and create a new perception.  
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Figure 8. Boyd’s OODA loop. Source: Boyd (2018). 
This process of destruction and creation occurs in the OODA loop through the 
cognitive processes in the orientation phase. As described in Boyd’s Organic Design for 
Command and Control, “Orientation is an interactive process of many sided implicit cross-
referencing projections, empathies, correlations, and rejections that is shaped by and shapes 
the interplay of genetic heritage, cultural tradition, previous experiences, and unfolding 
circumstances” (Osinga, 2007, p. 193). These traits within the orientation process act as a 
set of filters shaping one’s understanding of the environment and ultimately drive future 
observations, decisions, and actions (Boyd, 2018). Through this process, individuals make 
sense of observations by analyzing them based on those attributes and synthesizing them 
into a perception of reality. It is important to note that in Figure 8, the analyses/synthesis 
aspect of orientation is in an amorphous shape which reinforces the idea that what emerges 
from orientation is a perception of reality and potentially fallible. In order for this 
orientation to be successful, those mental images need to match the actual environment 
(Hammond, 2012).  
Boyd observed that the processes of observation, orientation, decision, and action 
represent the same series of events that occur during the command and control process, so 
the OODA loop is representative of command and control (Boyd, 2018). This is an 
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important connection because viewing the OODA loop as a C2 loop enables one to link 
Boyd’s concepts related to the OODA loop to C2. 
Perhaps the most important linkage is that operating within an adversary’s OODA 
loop is synonymous with operating inside the adversary’s C2 loop (Boyd, 2018). As such, 
the concepts of relative tempo apply to C2, in that a decision-maker who can observe, 
orient, decide, and act faster than their adversary has the advantage. Because of this, Boyd 
emphasized the importance of the orientation phase as it was the key portion of the loop 
that allowed the commander to make sense of the observations and drove their decisions, 
actions, and future observations.  
While orientation is widely be considered the most important part of the OODA 
loop, it must be acknowledged that one cannot orient properly without the requisite 
information derived from observations (Boyd, 2018; Hammond, 2012). The only way into 
an OODA loop is through observations, so if something is not observed, it cannot feed into 
one’s orientation (Boyd, 2018). As shown in Figure 8, these observations come from a 
variety of interactions with the external environment. In order for these sources of 
information to be able to be analyzed and synthesized, they must first be sensed. Thus, it 
could be said that if it cannot be sensed, it does not enter the loop (Boyd, 2018).  
Boyd’s theories focused on the human element of conflict. Boyd stated that “terrain 
does not fight wars. Machines don’t fight wars. People do it and they use their 
minds…machines are just tools that you use” (Brown, 2018, p. 202). This is not to say that 
he was an opponent of technology in general. After all, he was a fighter pilot and was 
instrumental in developing what would become the F-16 (Brown, 2018; Hammond, 2012). 
What Boyd (2018) detested was the view at the time that technology was a panacea and 
that the solution for any problem was to add more sensors, increase communications, and 
improve displays; unfortunately, this idea still permeates the DOD (Brose, 2020). 
Decision-makers increasingly make decisions based on observations derived from 
technological systems (indirect sensing) as opposed to directly observing the environment 
(direct sensing) (Hughes & Girrier, 2018). This means that before unfolding interactions 
with the environment and unfolding circumstances can be considered observations, they 
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must be sensed, formatted, transmitted, and displayed before it can be considered an 
observation entering one’s OODA loop. Examining these delays are important because of 
Boyd’s emphasis on the temporal element. Often the OODA loop is viewed from a 
systemic level in that the entire loops needs to be executed at a faster rate relative to the 
adversary. However, Plehn (2000) recognized that examining it at a component level 
exposes the processes that enable the loop to be executed faster. 
Both Brehmer (2005) and Plehn (2000) described delays within the OODA loop; 
however, their delays require refinement. The first is sensor delay, which is the interval 
from an event occurring to sensors detecting the event. As it pertains to this operational 
environment, this could be the delay between an adversary launching a missile and a sensor 
detecting the launch. Sensor delay can be effected by a variety of items such as sensor 
coverage, the type/band of energy to be detected by the sensor, as well as sensor specific 
techniques such as staring and scanning sensors (Olsen, 2016; Plehn, 2000). Additionally, 
there is processing delay, which is the interval between when the system detects the event 
and when that data is formatted and displayed/presented as useable information (Phillips 
et al., 2007). Such delays could stem from communications latency and processing 
capacity.  
One must also account for the implementation time, which is the time between when 
a decision is made and the initiation of the associated action, and action time, which is the 
time from when an event is commenced and when it takes effect (Brehmer, 2005).2 These 
are important concepts for command and control as they impact the decision-maker’s 
ability to have the desired impact.  
Understanding that most observations come from technological systems that have 
delays associated with them is important for command and control because it has 
implications on the ability of the decision-maker to make a timely decision. This means 
that technological systems can contribute to delays as can the human cognitive processes. 
This also indicates that observations, like orientation, are part of a process. As such, it is 
 
2 Brehmer (2005) refers to these terms as dead time and time constant; however, these terms tend to be 
misleading as to the nature of the delay. 
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important to expand the notion of observations beyond that of Boyd’s OODA loop in order 
to better reflect the impact of technological systems. This relates to the previous discussion 
of uncertainty and time.  
E. OTHER COMMAND AND CONTROL MODELS 
This section examines several C2 models that appear repeatedly throughout the 
literature. Such models can potentially augment Boyd’s OODA loop because the 
underlying theories of the models (e.g., cybernetics, cognitive science and organization 
theory) can provide some useful insights (Builder et al., 1999). As such, each model has 
benefits and drawbacks based on the underlying field of study. This is not to say that these 
theories are wrong, but rather illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of the models. This 
section will explore two of the more prominent C2 models, explain their benefits, 
drawbacks, and their contribution to C2.  
1. Lawson Model 
The Lawson model is a cybernetic approach to modeling a command and control 
system as a process (Builder et al., 1999). Lawson believed the system, depicted in Figure 
9 must have the ability to: perceive (sense) the environment, compare that perception to 
the desired state, and, if necessary, take action to bring the perceived environment closer 
to the desired state (Lawson, 1981). Lawson (1981) stressed the importance of the system 
to be able to provide the commander with an accurate representation of the environment. 
If it cannot provide the current picture of the operational environment, then it is of limited 
use to the commander.  
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Figure 9. Lawson model of C2. Source: Lawson (1981). 
As depicted in Figure 9, the Lawson model takes into account the need for 
technological systems to sense and process the data prior to the decision-maker being able 
to compare it with its desired state. Also useful is the incorporation of external data (i.e., 
data not sensed from the environment) into the act of processing. While not depicted on 
the model, Lawson’s (1981) work addressed the issue of time, and the impact it has on C2. 
While Figure 10 is a relatively simple analysis, it has tremendous implications for a C2 
systems, which can be better realized when put in the context of responding to the launch 
of an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM). If the event is the launching of the ASCM, then the 
response time that one must be concerned about is when the friendly missile intercepts the 
adversary missile. Thus, the system must detect the event, alert personnel, reach the 
decision to fire, and then actually fire the missile in such a time to allow that missile to 
intercept the incoming ASCM.  
34 
  
Figure 10. Lawson’s timeline analysis. Source: Lawson (1981). 
After initial publication, Lawson incorporated an adversary loop into the model, as 
depicted in Figure 11, which is also quite useful in the study of C2. First, that friendly and 
enemy forces share the same environment that can be sensed by both sides. Second, just as 
friendly forces can sense portions of the enemy force, so too can the enemy force. Third, 
that the enemy is going through these same general processes in order to execute their own 
command and control. Finally, because the adversary is going through the same process, 
they are a thinking adversary trying to take action on friendly forces in order to achieve 
their desired state (Hughes & Girrier, 2018). 
 
Figure 11. Lawson model with enemy. Source: Hughes and Girrier 
(2018). 
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While many cybernetic models such as Lawson’s accurately depict the steps and 
processes of command and control, they inadequately represent the complexity that 
humans bring to the system (Builder et al., 1999). Where Boyd’s model expanded on the 
orientation phase, the Lawson model does not expand on this element. That being said, 
Lawson’s timeline analysis as well as incorporating the enemy aspect provide more insight 
into C2 challenges. 
2. Wohl Model 
Wohl’s stimulus, hypothesis, option, response (SHOR) model (Figure 12) 
integrated aspects of the cybernetic paradigm with cognitive science by blending the 
process steps with the transformation of the data throughout the process (Builder et al., 
1999). By considering the human element, Wohl (1981) addressed the ability of the 
decision-maker to undergo a stimulus-response process where they quickly determine an 
option and/or response based on their familiarity situation and information available. This 
is similar to the concepts discussed by Klein (2017) and Kahneman (2013) from Chapter 
II. While it is not readily apparent from the model, Wohl (1981) embedded the cognitive 
and sensemaking aspects within the stimulus, hypothesis, and option stages to indicate that 
it is a continuous process.  
 
Figure 12. Wohl’s SHOR model. Source: Wohl (1981). 
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F. THE DYNAMIC MODEL OF SITUATION COGNITION 
The dynamic model of situated cognition (DMSC) integrated the human aspects of 
decision making with the characteristics of technological systems to produce a model that 
accurately describes what occurs in complex environments (Shattuck & Miller, 2006). In 
the DMSC, a series of ovals and lenses represents how data is extracted from the 
environment, formatted into information, and how the human element then makes sense of 
that information in order to produce a comprehension and projection of the environment. 
The left side of Figure 13 represents the inputs of technological systems and shows how 
data transitions from the external environment to being available to the decision-maker. 
The right side is the human portion of the system and incorporates the perceptual and 
cognitive aspects of sensemaking that allows users to perceive, comprehend and then 
project information. In doing so, it describes the formulation of each level of SA. In terms 
of Boyd’s OODA loop, observations align with Oval 4 and orientation aligns with the 
processes through Ovals 5–6. As such, the DMSC shows that technological systems 




Figure 13. Shattuck and Miller’s dynamic model of situated cognition. 
Source: Shattuck & Miller (2006). 
In Figure 13, Oval 1 is the ground truth reality and completely accurate. As such, 
the model is dynamic because Oval 1 is constantly changing and evolving with the 
environment (Shattuck & Miller, 2006). Everything, whether it can be sensed or not, is 
present in Oval 1. Oval 2 represents data that are detected by systems, which is, at best, a 
subset of the data available in Oval 1, because sensors cannot capture everything in the 
environment. Of the data that are sensed, Oval 3 represents the subset of what data is 
actually available to a decision-maker (Shattuck & Miller, 2006). 
Data inaccuracies are inherent in systems and occur due to a variety of reasons. Un-
sensed data are not present after Oval 1. This can occur due to out-of-band data, inadequate 
sensor coverage, or malfunctioning sensors. Data that was misidentified either due to 
adversary spoofing or algorithm errors appear as stars and circles in Oval 2 (Shattuck & 
Miller, 2006). Data that are filtered out by the system are no longer depicted in the system, 
and data that are displayed incorrectly are represented by a cross in Oval 3 (Shattuck & 
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Miller, 2006). These errors are important because they propagate through the system and 
can impact a decision-maker’s comprehension and projection of the environment.  
The perceptual and cognitive portion of the model contains three lenses each of 
which act as filters to affect how information is perceived, comprehended, and projected 
(Shattuck & Miller, 2006). At least six classes of information comprise the lenses: 
individual states/traits, social factors, local context, the plan/mission/orders, guidelines/
doctrine, and past experiences (Shattuck & Miller, 2006). As one could imagine, these 
attributes are just as dynamic as the environment and are continually influenced by new 
information and experiences as well as physiological and psychological states. While each 
of the lenses encompasses the same attributes, they each perform different functions 
(Shattuck et al., 2007). Lens A affects what information is actually perceived by the 
decision-maker in Oval 4, so what is perceived is a subset of what is available in Oval 3 
(Shattuck & Miller, 2006). Lens B influences how the user organizes the perceived data 
into information to formulate a comprehension of the environment in Oval 5. Likewise, 
Lens C affects how that comprehension becomes their projection about the future in Oval 
6 (Shattuck & Miller, 2006).  
In Ovals 5 and 6, the composed figures within the dark ovals represent the 
comprehension and projection of the decision-maker respectively. Thus, in a similar 
manner to Boyd, the end result is an orientation on the situation. Amorphous shapes 
Surround these ovals and represent alternate ways to synthesize the information into 
comprehension and projection (Shattuck & Miller, 2006). These take into account the idea 
that there can be differing orientations on the same data (Hammond, 2012; Shattuck & 
Miller, 2006).  
The desired end state is for a decision-maker to achieve a level of SA in Oval 6 
such that it represents Oval 1 to the extent necessary to make a prudent decision. This is 
represented in the left graph in Figure 14. As depicted, there is a decreasing percentage of 
data available as one progresses through the system. It is possible that an experienced 
decision-maker, through their knowledge, attributes, and attitudes in their lenses, is able to 
form a more accurate comprehension of the environment from the limited perceived data 
in Oval 4 (Shattuck et al., 2007). In other words, an experienced decision-maker can fill in 
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missing pieces in order to form a more complete picture. Thus, by Oval 6 the projection of 
the environment closely resembles Oval 1. The graph to the right in Figure 14 demonstrates 
the impact of erroneous data permeating through the system, and demonstrates how the 
decision-maker’s comprehension and projection can marginally reflect reality. One must 
also take into account the decision-maker’s lenses: a well-focused lens can help mitigate 
the erroneous data whereas a poorly-focused lens can promote the distortions (Shattuck et 
al., 2007). 
 
Figure 14. A quantitative view of the DMSC. Source: Shattuck et al. 
(2007).  
Like the OODA loop, the DMSC contains feedback loops to represent the cyclical 
nature of the model. Because one’s comprehensions and projections impact future 
iterations of the model, feedback loops emanate from Ovals 5 and 6 to each of the preceding 
ovals as depicted in Figure 15. As a decision-maker orients on the situation, they may add 
data to the environment (Oval 1), adjust sensor coverage (Oval 2), adjust collection or 
display requirements (Oval 3), and even adjust their information-pull (Oval 4). Likewise, 
one’s projection of the environment (Oval 6) influences future iterations of their 
comprehension of data (Oval 5). As previously mentioned, decision-makers’ lenses are just 
as dynamic as the environment. Thus, there are feedback loops that extend from both Oval 
5 and Oval 6 to each of the lenses as depicted in Figure 16 (Shattuck & Miller, 2006). Thus 
as Shattuck and Miller stated, “The comprehensions, projections, and decisions we make 
contribute to the manner in which we view the world” (Shattuck & Miller, 2006, p. 11) 
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Figure 15. Feedback loops from Ovals 5 and 6 to Ovals 1–4. Source: 
Miller and Shattuck (2006). 
 
Figure 16. Feedback loops from Ovals 5 and 6 to the lenses. Source: 
Miller & Shattuck (2006). 
One of the primary benefits of the DMSC is the ability to link technological systems 
with human cognition thereby linking multiple portions of a C2 system. This facilitates 
some important insights as to how those systems can impact decision-making especially in 
the operational environment. The size of Oval 2 is directly related to the ability to sense 
the environment. As sensors increase in quantity, have a greater range, provide higher 
quality data, and are able to capture more of the environment, Oval 2 increases in size. 
Such improvements can help scout more of the environment in order to counter the ranges 
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of adversary sensors and systems (Hughes & Girrier, 2018). Conversely, adversary OIE, 
particularly electro-magnetic spectrum operations (EMSO) can diminish the size of Oval 
2 by preventing sensors from obtaining data. Thus, Oval 2 is also dynamic. 
Philips et al. (2007) added to the study of the DMSC by incorporating a processing 
block between Ovals 2 and 3. The addition stemmed from their analysis on the time 
required from when data was sensed (Oval 2) to when it was perceived by the user (Oval 
4). Their dataset demonstrated that organically sensed data could move relatively quickly 
from Oval 2 to Oval 4 meaning that the user was able to perceive it in a timely manner 
(Phillips et al., 2007). However, when the data was part of a data dump from higher 
headquarters, it took hours for that information to become available (Phillips et al., 2007). 
This has important implications for the operational environment. Due to the limited 
connectivity, large influxes of data could happen more frequently once connectivity is 
restored, and take time to process. Thus, potentially important information may not be 
available to a decision-maker due delays in processing the data and enabling the user to 
perceive the information. 
One can also gain greater insights by expanding the meaning of Oval 2 to 
encompass networked information systems especially in light of the extensive networking 
described by Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) which will be discussed 
in Chapter IV. Data stored in the cloud-like environment would be considered part of Oval 
1. As data is stored and shared, one’s ability to access that data would be encompassed by 
Oval 2. This is the same concept as being connected to cloud storage on one’s personal 
computer. The data resides in the environment, and in order to access it one needs network 
connectivity. This is an important extension for the operating environment. If connectivity 
is unrestricted, one would have a large Oval 2 because they have access to a larger amount 
of data from the environment. However, when RF communications are contested and 
EMCON procedures imposed ones access to this data would significantly decrease thus 
shrinking Oval 2. In order to leverage the increased data, the system must be able to process 
and display that amount of information (Oval 3). Perhaps the most limiting factor, is the 
user’s ability to perceive that data (Oval 4) (Buchler et al., 2016; Marusich et al., 2016).  
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Both Boyd (2018) and Lawson (Hughes & Girrier, 2018) described friendly and 
adversary C2 systems interacting with each other, and the G. A. Miller et al. (2007) 
expanded the DMSC to do the same thing. Because the battlespace is shared by both 
friendly (blue) and adversary (red) forces, both entities share Oval 1. As such, friendly and 
adversary DMSCs can be depicted as shown in Figure 17. This depiction helps re-frame 
how one conceptualizes the battlespace and supports the notion of getting inside an 
adversary’s decision-making process while protecting one’s own against deception and 
OIE (Brown, 2016).  
 
Figure 17. Red and blue forces in the DMSC. Source: Miller et al. 
(2007). 
Both friendly and adversary forces share the environment, but what sets them apart 
and allows each side to capture their desired data is their Oval 2 capabilities. Because red 
and blue forces possess their own suites of sensors with their own capabilities and 
limitations, each side has their unique Oval 2. From there, their own systems and processes 
can facilitate red and blue situational awareness. This also shows that through means such 
as cyber operations and signals intelligence that one can access the other’s data by 
developing the appropriate Oval 2 capabilities. 
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Figure 17 is particularly useful when examining the operational environment. Both 
U.S. and Chinese forces are competing within the same information environment. The 
access of each side to the data in that environment relies on their sensor coverage and their 
ability to present that data. Each side’s lenses provide a means through which to perceive 
the data, reach a level of comprehension, and project likely future events.  
The DMSC shows that while there may be ample data in the environment, the 
ability of that data to impact a decision-maker’s orientation is based on the ability to 
correctly sense and display the data while also enabling the decision-maker to perceive the 
pertinent information. Extending this same thought to EABO, the ability of the stand-in 
forces to correctly orient on the situation is predicated on their ability to accurately execute 
the DMSC. They must correctly sense and synthesize the data so their projection in Oval 
6 aligns with the environment in Oval 1. 
G. COMMAND DYNAMIC MODEL OF SITUATED COGNITION  
Katz (2019) applied the DMSC to studies of military hierarchies and structures to 
create the command dynamic model of situated cognition (CDMSC), which demonstrated 
how information gaps inherently form as information flowed from sensor to decision-
maker. Like in command and feedback, the direction from the commander flows from the 
top-down; however, as Figure 18 shows, the data and information flow from the bottom-
up. The model consists of three levels. At the bottom of the hierarchy are technical 
specialists who are support staff such as system operators, clerks, analysts, etc. The second 
level consists of the principal advisors who could be thought of as department heads or 
staff, and the third level is the commander (Katz, 2019). The benefit of these terms is that 
they can be applied to nearly any hierarchy. 
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Figure 18. Command dynamic model of situated cognition Source: 
Katz (2019). 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the CDMSC is how it illustrates the variations 
of the DMSC as one moves up the hierarchy. The system operators, the technical specialists 
are the individuals actually working with those systems in question. Oval 1 is the same for 
each of the specialists as discussed in the previous section. Depending on the type of system 
and location of the system, one can begin to see differences in their Oval 2. For example, 
the red column may have a different Oval 2 than the green column because they are in 
completely different locations. Within like-color columns, Oval 2 can be different between 
individuals because of the different types of sensors and spectrums in which they operate. 
From there, each individual continues through their DMSC to formulate a projection (Katz, 
2019). As depicted in Figure 18, groups can engage with others both laterally and vertically 
in order to resolve some uncertainty. 
Because technical specialists work for the principal advisors, they essentially fulfill 
the role of the sensors in the principal advisor’s DMSC (Katz, 2019). Principal advisors 
receive their inputs come from the projections of the technical specialists. Additionally, 
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because principal advisors can view the screens of the technical specialists, they have 
access to their Oval 3 (Katz, 2019). This enables them to not only utilize their projections, 
but also view the information available to them as they formulated that projection. This 
same process occurs at the commander’s level. The projections of each of the principal 
advisors form the inputs to the commander’s DMSC, and the commander has access to the 
information present on each of the technical specialists’ Oval 3s throughout the command 
(Katz, 2019).  
Katz’ (2019) analysis of information gaps demonstrated that data and information 
errors generated at the technical specialist level can permeate through the hierarchy to 
influence the projection of the commander, and thus their decisions as well.  
The expansion of Oval 2 discussed in the previous section also applies to the 
CDMSC. For example, data sensed by a sensor (Oval 2) in the red column could be stored 
as either sensor data or formatted information in Oval 1 via a cloud-like environment. This 
would enable technical specialists from the green and yellow columns to access this data 
as long as they have the connectivity and bandwidth to retrieve the data. When 
communications are uncontested, this would mean that each of the columns would have a 
greatly expanded Oval 2. However, if the information environment became contested, 
individual Oval 2s could shrink based on the type of denials and degradation. In practical 
terms this could prevent entities from retrieving data from the environment as well as 
sharing data in the environment.  
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the concepts of Boyd’s OODA loop and views of command 
and control as they related to Marine Corps C2 doctrine. As such, the Marine Corps views 
command and control simply as the means by which the commander recognizes what must 
be done and sees that the appropriate actions are taken (United States Marine Corps, 
2018b). This means that the OODA loop and decision-making theories are central to the 
execution of C2.  
Given this model, Boyd’s Organic Design for Command and Control showed that 
C2 in many ways are layers of OODA loops. In order to defeat an adversary, one’s OODA 
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loop needs to turn at a faster tempo than an adversary’s. When this is applied to a C2 
construct, the overall system of OODA loops must operate at a faster tempo. Marine Corps 
doctrine facilitates this speed by a command and feedback mentality where the commander 
makes a decision, communicates it to their forces and seeks feedback to drive further 
decisions. This also facilitates mission command where commanders communicate their 
intent to subordinates and allow them to operate in such a manner that it fulfills that intent.  
Because of the Marine Corps’ view of command and control and its use of mission 
type orders, it is critical that lower-level decision-makers are able to make the appropriate 
level decisions in accordance with the commander’s intent. Linking this to Boyd’s OODA 
loop, this means that the decision-maker must be able to observe the environment and 
orient on it in such a manner that their understanding with the environment allows for a 
decision that is in-line with the commander’s intent. Additionally, as the environment 
changes, the decision-maker must have a means to update their commander’s intent should 
the greater situation change.  
While the “elegant simplicity” enables its application to myriad domains, it also 
leads to shortfalls (Gray, 1999, p. 91). Most notably is that the observe phase of the loop 
does not take into account the impact of technological systems. Models such as the Wohl 
and Lawson models identify the presence of technological systems, but do not describe the 
impacts on decision-making. The DMSC offered a way to update the OODA loop by 
incorporating elements of technological systems. 
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IV. CURRENT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT AND 
CHALLENGES 
As the character of conflict changes, so too must the character of command and 
control. While the nature of command and control largely remains unchanged, the character 
of it must change to enable the commander to exercise command and control as the 
character of warfare changes. Vassiliou et al. (2014) proposed that four megatrends (Figure 
19) impact the future of C2 and drive changes in C2 systems: big problems, robustly 
networked environments, ubiquitous data, and new forms of organization. In this context, 
strategic competition with China is the big problem. The re-born concepts of Network-
centric Warfare (NCW) as Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) form the 
robustly networked environment. The increased amount of data provided by the network 
as well as the distribution of forces contributes to the ubiquitous data. Finally, the 
organizational aspect of distributed maritime operations (DMO) and EABO drive new 
forms of organizations and the challenges contained therein. This chapter explores each of 
these as they relate to C2 doctrine and theory. In order to limit the scope of this chapter, 
the analysis will be limited to China; however, it should be noted that these concepts would 
apply to other peer adversaries as well. 
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Figure 19. Megatrends transforming C2. Source: Vassilou et al. 
(2014). 
A. COMPETITION  
The idea of competition stems from adversaries such as Russia and China 
conducting a variety of malign activities to slowly and incrementally achieve their own 
national objectives while remaining below the threshold of violence (Department of the 
Navy, 2020). In order to combat this, U.S. and allied partners must uphold the rules-based 
order in order to thwart incremental gains (Department of the Navy, 2020). This is akin to 
the U.S. involvement in the Tanker Wars during the Iran-Iraq War where then Secretary of 
Defense Caspar Weinberger said, “We are not at war, but certainly not at peace” (Levinson 
& Edwards, 1997, p. 4). Figure 20 illustrates this environment as a competition continuum 
where forces can be involved in operations below the threshold of violence, yet any 
missteps during those operations could cross that threshold.  
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Figure 20. The linear competition continuum model. Source: United 
States Marine Corps (2020). 
Chinese territorial disputes regarding the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, 
Scarborough Shoal and the Senkaku Islands create tensions between China and countries 
like Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam, and effects the balance of power in the 
region (O’Rourke, 2021b). Additionally, Chinese expansion into the Spratlys and other 
islands in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS), to include the construction 
of man-made islands, enables China to project power past the First Island Chain 
(Department of Defense, 2020). Chinese maritime forces accomplish their aims through 
coercion and intimidation, and the goal of U.S. and allied forces is to counter this through 
their presence (Department of the Navy, 2020; O’Rourke, 2021b). 
Executing C2 in such an environment is inherently difficult; in fact, it is more 
difficult than executing C2 conventional war(Hughes & Girrier, 2018). In this 
environment, the tactical situation and associated decision-making can and will have 
significant strategic implications (Tangredi, 2018). This strains the ability to execute 
mission command because of the risks associated with crossing the threshold of violence 
by mistakenly firing on a Chinese aircraft or PLAN vessel. Crossing that threshold, or even 
approaching it, could have ramifications ranging from nuclear threat to restricting the 
export of rare earth metals (Fleischaker & Sinnott, 2021; Tangredi, 2018).  
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B. A2/AD OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
Anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities seek to provide a credible threat 
against vessels in a given area. This prevents adversary vessels from operating in a certain 
area without accepting an unreasonably high level of risk (United States Marine Corps, 
2021). China’s A2AD capabilities are driven by a combination of long range anti-ship 
cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, long range over-the-horizon radar systems, 
increasingly capable naval forces, and an array of man-made islands from which to deploy 
those forces (Department of Defense, 2020; O’Rourke, 2021b; United States Marine Corps, 
2021).  
Figure 21 depicts some of China’s A2AD capabilities in the SCS, and shows that 
U.S. and Allied vessels operating in these areas do so within the weapons engagement 
zones (WEZ) of a variety of adversary weapons systems including advanced anti-ship 
cruise missiles (ASCM) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) (Department of Defense, 
2020). To counter such a threat, the Marine Corps developed the EABO concept to allow 
the Marine Corps to operate within the WEZ and provide a consistent presence. 
Traditionally the Marine Corps fights from the sea onto shore, but in this case, the concept 
is reversed to project sea power from ashore. By utilizing a light, highly mobile, highly 
capable, and dispersed force, the Marine Corps seeks to “reverse the cost imposition that 
determined adversaries seek to impose on the joint force” (Berger, 2019, p. 11). In doing 
so, the concept shifts the discussion from how the U.S. will operate in the vicinity of 




Figure 21. Chinese military facilities in the South China Sea. Source: 
O’Rourke (2021b). 
The persistent threat of operating within the WEZ creates C2 challenges in an 
A2AD environment. Operators must always be on the alert and prepared for if/when the 
adversary intends to cross the threshold (Berger, 2021). Through the use of the OODA 
loop, decision-makers must be able to observe adversary actions, determine whether they 
present a threat, if that threat necessitates crossing the threshold of violence, and 
determining the prudent course of action. These observations are generally the product of 
technological systems, so those forces must be equipped with the systems and processing 
capability to organically determine the status of an adversary threat system.  
There is also a human element to this as well. The stresses of being on alert when 
combined with the uncertainty and ambiguity the adversary injects into the scenario can 
have tremendous impacts on one’s decision-making capability (Hughes & Girrier, 2018; 
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Klein, 2017; United States Marine Corps, 2020). These human factors can impact the 
manner in which one orients upon a situation.  
C. EXPEDITIONARY ADVANCED BASE OPERATIONS 
EABO are defined as a “form of expeditionary warfare that involves the 
employment of mobile, low-signature, persistent, and relatively easy to maintain and 
sustain naval expeditionary forces from a series of austere, temporary locations ashore or 
inshore within a contested or potentially contested maritime area in order to conduct area 
denial, support sea control, or enable fleet sustainment” (United States Marine Corps, 2021, 
p. 1-3). These operations involve the use of stand-in forces and stand-off forces that are 
designed to operate inside and outside of the WEZ respectively. Some of their potential 
tasks include surveillance and reconnaissance, surface warfare operations, air and missile 
defense, strike operations, and forward arming and refueling point (FARP) operations 
(United States Marine Corps, 2021).  
Figure 22 depicts a representation of stand-off and stand-in forces. If one pictures 
each iteration of the stand-in force as an OODA loop, the decision-maker at each of the 
iterations must be able to execute that loop in order to continuously observe the 




Figure 22. Depiction of stand-off and stand-in forces. Source: United 
States Marine Corps (2021). 
Ideally, in an uncontested information environment each of the stand-in forces 
would be able to collect and share their sensor data to allow each of the stand-in forces and 
the stand-off force to achieve a similar orientation. This would allow each force to 
incorporate a greater number of observations into their orientation and gain a better 
orientation of the littoral operations area. When commanders and their subordinates share 
the same orientation, the subordinates are better situated to execute the commander’s intent 
in the form of mission orders (Boyd, 2018). Thus, in this scenario, a commander could 
reasonably be assured that their lower-level decision-makers are equipped to execute their 
intent without further direction. However, this capacity diminishes as the information 
environment becomes contested and/or forces become more widely dispersed. 
While littoral forces are reliant on higher echelons for information and intelligence, 
they may not have access to these observations in an EMCON or contested information 
environment (United States Marine Corps, 2021). When this occurs, uncertainty can 
increase significantly, presenting a block to the C2 process. A unit’s observations may be 
limited to their organic sensing and processing capability meaning that the inputs into their 
OODA loops decrease and can diminish their ability to orient correctly resulting in a flawed 
perception of the operating environment (Hammond, 2012). This could be mitigated by 
overlapping sensor coverage to the extent possible, which may allow those forces to 
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capture the same data; however, depending on the dispersion of the forces, this may not be 
possible. When this occurs, it would be more likely that the various stand-in forces develop 
varying orientations of the environment, which in turn drives decisions and actions.  
Likewise, as data and information sharing decreases, it diminishes the ability of 
higher echelons to monitor and evaluate the progress of these operations thus increasing 
uncertainty at higher levels. This means a commander has fewer inputs into their OODA 
loop, which may limit their ability to orient and correctly assess the situation, which in turn 
affects their decision-making capability. 
The danger in these varying orientations is that different elements within the littoral 
operations area could have different perceptions of the environment. Given the right 
combination of perceptions, personality, and authority, it is certainly conceivable that these 
align to result in unintended engagements or missed opportunities.  
The purpose of EABO is to be able to operate within the adversary WEZ, so, 
naturally, time represents a challenge to C2. With longer range sensors and engagement 
ranges, the time available to execute the OODA loop diminishes (Hughes & Girrier, 2018). 
As such, sensor delays, processing delays and others can have tremendous impacts. 
Likewise, once that information is available to the decision-maker, if it is not readily 
consumable or displayed in such a way to yield a clear interpretation, it can extend the 
orientation time required. All of these aspects can stretch the OODA loop, and all of them 
are the result of technological systems.  
D. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE AND JOINT ALL-DOMAIN 
COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is the DOD’s vision for the 
future of C2 systems, yet it has its roots in the concepts of Network Centric Warfare 
(NCW). Because JADC2 will form the basis for the technological systems utilized during 
EABO it is important to examine how NCW and JADC2 can impact C2. 
As described by Cebrowski and Garstka (1998) NCW is the idea that advanced 
information sharing would enable greater awareness across the battlespace and enhance the 
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ability to deter or prevail in a conflict. A DOD report to Congress described how NCW 
was embodied by four tenets: 
1. A robustly networked force improves information sharing. 
2. Information sharing enhances the quality of information and shared 
situational awareness. 
3. Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self-
synchronization; and enhances sustainability and speed of command. 
4. These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness (Department 
of Defense, 2001, p. 4-1). 
These tenets act as linked hypotheses that build upon each other to create a value-added 
chain that could improve C2 (Alberts, 2017).  
Hughes and Girrier (2018) described perhaps the most important aspect of NCW in 
that the range and speed of modern missiles significantly increase the area that must be 
scouted in order to gain a sufficient amount of data. This coverage could best be achieved 
by integrating sensors from various platforms and sharing it so that the overall mosaic 
covers the desired area. In this context, NCW is not a concept declaring that networks are 
the panacea, but rather a necessity in order to maintain the scouting and decision-making 
capability required by modern weapons. In other words, it can expand Oval 2 of the DMSC.  
It is important to remember that NCW was a concept to drive the implementation, 
integration, and usage of sensors and networks. It consists of sensor, C2, and shooter grids 
that overlap. Thus through robust networking and data-sharing, one is literally linking 
together sensors, decision-makers and shooters (Hughes & Girrier, 2018). By linking 
together these three entities, decision-makers could have access to a tremendous amount 
of data, which it was believed would lead to better decisions. However, having too much 
information can lead to information overload and uncertainty, so simply having more data 
does not automatically lead to better decision-making. Despite this, having access to a 
plethora of data is in-line with the concept of a commander’s information-pull. Such a 
connected network allows the staff to seek specific data desired by the commander. 
Additionally, if the data had not already been collected, such connectivity could allow the 
collection of said data in a shorter period of time, since they would have access to a wider 
array of sensors distributed across the environment (United States Marine Corps, 2018b).  
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As the NCW literature indicates, such changes in technology also require 
organizational changes in order to prevent information from becoming bogged down in 
hierarchical systems. Likewise, higher velocity information requires procedural changes to 
ensure the commander receives the most current information (Alberts et al., 1999). This 
reinforces the concept that changes in the technological aspect of the C2 system 
necessitates adjustments in other portions of the system in order to take full advantage of 
the changes.  
The Naval services intend to leverage Project Overmatch and JADC2 as part of the 
networking structure to operate in this environment (Department of the Navy, 2020). 
JADC2 is the DOD’s concept to connect sensors from each of the military services into a 
single network in order to “enable faster decisionmaking” (Hoehn, 2021, p. 2). In fact, 
“JADC2 intends to help commanders make better decisions by collecting data from 
numerous sensors, processing the data using artificial intelligence algorithms to identify 
targets, and then recommending the optimal weapon…to engage the target” (Hoehn, 2021, 
p. 2).  
Despite this vision of data sharing across the Joint Force, it still must contend with 
the denied and degraded information environment as previously discussed. The network 
promises to be resilient with all things being connected, and, by leveraging AI, the AI could 
determine which paths are available and efficient (Berger, 2019; Galdorisi, 2021; Hoehn, 
2021). Yet, unless communication methods are developed utilizing other-than radio 
frequencies (RF), they are still subject to EMCON and being contested. Thus, forces 
conducting operations in these regions must still be able to operate in a data and 
communication limited environment.  
E. NETWORK OPTIONAL WARFARE 
One of the main drawbacks of NCW and JADC2, especially in the littorals against 
a peer adversary, is that they require constant network connections. Network traffic flows 
transmitted through RF enable adversaries to detect the presence of friendly units. 
Additionally, adversary operations in the information environment (OIE) could impact the 
friendly forces ability to communicate, even in a network such as JADC2.  
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One of the ways to combat this is to utilize network optional warfare (NOW) 
(Hughes & Girrier, 2018). The idea behind NOW is that network connectivity is able to be 
adjusted based on the threat level and EMCON. When there are no restrictions, the network 
could operate as normal, but, when necessary, communications could be kept at an absolute 
minimum. Such a concept not only requires the development of alternative forms of 
communication, but more importantly, it requires units to be able to function without the 
ability of communications.  
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter described the current/future operating environment and described the 
challenges it poses to C2 and C2 systems. The technological problem stems from a 
contested information environment, so forces need to be able to form an accurate 
orientation of the environment under full and restricted communication and data 
availability. This creates challenges at the personnel level because as inputs to the OODA 
loop are limited, one has a limited ability to sufficiently orient on the environment. 
Organizationally, the differences in the observe-orient process can cause decision-makers 
at different levels to arrive at different decisions and actions. Additionally, the impacts of 
limited information sharing and communication can increase levels of uncertainty, which 
exacerbate an already time constrained environment.  
JADC2 as a concept is in development in order to provide the benefits of NCW to 
the operating environment. However, while such a robust and resilient network could link 
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V. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. OODA LOOP 2.0: A MODEL FOR COMPETITION AND EABO 
This model is intended to be an update of Boyd’s OODA loop that incorporates 
pertinent concepts from decision-making theories (Chapter II) in order to enable C2 
concepts (Chapter III) to be utilized in the current operating environment (Chapter IV). 
OODA loop 2.0 (Figure 23) incorporates the various theories discussed during this research 
while maintaining the overall OODA construct. This allows for the continued application 
of A Discourse on Winning and Losing at a systemic level while reframing how one views 
the loop at a component level.  
B. INTERNAL VALIDATION  
Because the DMSC was developed to account for the impact of technological 
systems on decision-making, in this model it is embedded in the observe and orient portions 
of the OODA loop. The technological systems portion resides under the observe and the 
perceptual and cognitive systems reside under orientation. In doing so, it more accurately 
describes how these processes are conduct or will be conducted in the operating 
environment.  
1. Observation  
An individual’s observations are not predominantly directly sensed from the 
environment, but rather an in-direct observation provided by a system (Hughes & Girrier, 
2018). This is not to say that all observations come from systems, which is why there are 
inputs between Oval 3 and Lens A, that stem directly from the environment. In this way, 
these direct observations fall in the same spot on the DMSC as those from other advisors. 
In a larger sense, one’s observations are a combination of what one observes via 
technological systems and what one directly observes from the environment, which may, 





Figure 23. OODA loop 2.0. Adapted from Boyd (2018), Endsley (1995), Hughes & Girrier (2018), Kahneman 
(2013), Klein (2017), Lawson (1981), Shattuck & Miller (2006). 
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This detail provides greater granularity to the observation process, which is 
important in the operating environment. The technological systems portion of the DMSC 
demonstrates not only the reliance on technological systems, but also how data flows 
throughout the C2 process. This facilitates insights into ways in which this flow can be 
interrupted either through adversary operations or through the nature of the operating 
environment (Brown, 2016; United States Marine Corps, 2021a). This model also 
incorporates a processing block between Oval 2 and Oval 3. This allows one to visualize 
not only the need for data processing, but it also effects the speed with which data moves 
from Oval 2 to Oval 3 and beyond (Phillips et al., 2007). 
Included in Oval 1 is all of the data in the environment. Additionally, the model 
illustrates that items from the original OODA loop such as unfolding circumstances and 
external feedback are resident in Oval 1. This indicates that one’s ability to receive these 
inputs is predicated on the ability to retrieve them from the environment through Oval 2. 
Additionally, networked and shared data reside in Oval 1 as well. Once again, the ability 
to access this data is linked to connectivity provided through Oval 2. 
One of the most important aspects of the observation phase is the dynamic nature 
of Oval 2 as it relates to the environment. Oval 2 is depicted as being partially washed out 
and surrounded by dashed lines in order to illustrate its ability to grow or shrink based on 
factors such as network connectivity, OIE, and EMCON. This allows the model to depict 
the implications of such restrictions as they relate to uncertainty.  
As in the original DMSC, this Oval 2 is still a subset of Oval 1. When expanded, 
Oval 2 captures more of the environment which puts the onus on processing and display 
capabilities (Oval 3) in order to allow the decision-maker to perceive the information (Oval 
3). When reduced, Oval 2 captures less of the environment in Oval 1 which provides 
limited perceptions to Oval 4. 
The idea that orientation can drive observations from the original OODA loop is 
illustrated by the presence of analysis and synthesis Lens A between Oval 3 and Oval 4. 
This demonstrates that items such as mission and goals influence what perceptions one 
pulls from the available information in Oval 3. With the volume and availability of data, it 
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is important to illustrate that only a portion of the available data can be perceived by the 
decision-maker. This interaction between the technological system and perceptions is 
analogous to Endsley’s (1995) description of Level 1 SA.  
2. Orientation 
In this model, the perceptual and cognitive system of the DMSC forms the basis of 
orientation, and the information moves through the model as in the original. Once the 
information is perceived by the decision-maker, it passes through analysis and synthesis 
Lens B to provide the decision-maker a comprehension of the meaning of those perceptions 
in Oval 5. This is similar to Endsley’s (1995) Level 2 SA, and Shattuck and Miller’s (2006) 
description of movement through the DMSC.  
Once one has a comprehension (Oval 5), the elements of analysis and synthesis 
(Lens C) provide further meaning to those constructs in order to provide the decision-maker 
with a projection of the future status of those comprehensions (Oval 6). This is analogous 
to Endsley’s (1995) Level 3 SA. 
The lenses of the DMSC are analogous to the implicit cross-referencing conducted 
during Boyd’s orientation phase. As such, the traits of the two models are merged into a 
larger cross-referencing apparatus that also incorporates traits from Klein (2009). Thus, 
theses analysis and synthesis lenses include: mental models, cultural traditions and social 
factors, personal background and individual traits, new information, tacit knowledge and 
experiences, local context, orders, plans and guidance, and doctrine and operating concepts 
(Boyd, 2018; Klein, 2009; Shattuck & Miller, 2006). As in the original DMSC, Lens A, B, 
and C are the same; however, different elements from those lenses would be utilized based 
on which lens was in use. 
3. Decision and Action 
The decision and action elements of the model remained largely unchanged from 
Boyd’s model because the existing structure already aligned with elements of NDM and 
the dual-system model. Fast, reflexive decisions are illustrated by an arrow from 
orientation direct to action. In these situations, the orientation phase shrinks dramatically 
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because of the System 1 processes (Kahneman, 2013). More deliberate and analytical 
methods such as System 2 thinking would go through the longer method of orientation, 
decision and action as depicted. The model also aligns with the RPD model because it 
incorporates similar cognitive aspects in the orientation phase, while allowing for the 
simulation of decision options and modifications through hypothesis and feedback. 
Additionally, the model aligns with Endsley (1995) and Weick (2008) in that the actual 
decision and action are driven-by yet separated from the cognitive processes of SA and 
sensemaking. Thus, the projection from Oval 6 is what drives the decision. 
4. Feedback Loops 
Just as in the original OODA loop, DMSC and RPD, feedback loops play an 
important role in this model and demonstrate the dynamic and cyclical nature of this model 
(Boyd, 2018; Klein, 2017; Shattuck & Miller, 2006). Given that the Marine Corps’ 
command and control philosophy is built upon command and feedback, these loops are 
critical for the C2 system as well as individual decision-making (United States Marine 
Corps, 2018b). The model illustrates external feedback resulting from actions as an input 
to Oval 1. This indicates that the primary method of receiving feedback from unfolding 
interactions with the environment is by sensing the environment. One’s ability to receive 
the feedback portion of command and feedback is dependent on the ability to sense and 
extract that data from the environment. One can potentially increase tempo by having a 
more robust system of observations in order to facilitate swift feedback. For example, if 
one is trying to get feedback from an EABO, they could do so through chat systems, email, 
radio communications, etc. Those all constitute data elements in the environment that must 
be sensed through network connectivity or RF comms by Oval 2; however, those methods 
of communication may not be available due to EMCON or adversary OIE. As such, one 
would not be able to receive feedback.  
Additionally, the internal feedback loops from the DMSC are merged with the 
decision feedback loop to show that comprehensions, projections, and decisions result in 
feedback to each preceding oval. In an effort to maintain clarity in the model, the feedback 
loops to the analysis and synthesis lenses are omitted from the model. To be clear, feedback 
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to the lenses exist as they did in the original DMSC, and once again comprehensions, 
projections and decisions contribute to updating and altering elements within the analysis 
and synthesis lenses. 
5. Time 
Time is critical in the C2 process. As such, this model takes time into account in 
several places. First, the time arrow beneath the model represents time as it relates to the 
overall model and the environment. This is in keeping with Boyd’s belief that success was 
gained from operating within an adversary’s OODA loop (Boyd, 2018). This remains true; 
however, one’s ability to do so is directly impacted by one’s own OODA process. Time is 
also illustrated by the dual-sided arrows that frame the observation and orientation 
elements of the DMSC. These represent how aspects of the technological system as well 
as the perceptual and cognitive system can increase the time to observe and orient due to a 
variety of reasons. For example, processing delays or network latency can extend the time 
required to move data throughout the system and delay perceptions. Likewise, uncertainty 
can cause delays in comprehension and projections, and any feedback or requests for 
additional information can extend this time. 
As in Boyd’s original OODA loop, the speed at which one can operate depends 
upon the rapidity with which one can execute the OODA loop 2.0. When technological 
systems are incorporated into the model, it demonstrates that that observe-orient process is 
driven by the speed at which the system can receive and process data and how fast the 
human operator can then gain situational awareness from the data received.  
6. Networked and shared data 
Given the importance of shared data and information in JADC2, it is important to 
note how such data is represented in the model. This cloud-like connected environment is 
represented by data residing in Oval 1, and one’s ability to retrieve that data is linked to 
network connectivity in Oval 2. As such, this model illustrates the need for efficient and 
accurate information-pull so that Oval 3 displays relevant information. Additionally, this 
can model the effects of contested network communications. If network connectivity is 
diminished through EMCON or adversary actions, it would shrink Oval 2 and prevent data 
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from moving throughout the model. Additionally, it means that updates to the command 
concept, intelligence summaries, bulletins, etc., would still need to follow the same path 
through the system, albeit at perhaps a higher priority, as other information. This is 
important for Ovals 3 and 4 in that a user must still be able to perceive the information in 
order to be able leverage it. This could come into play in a time sensitive or chaotic 
environment where the attention of users is directed elsewhere that an important piece of 
information could be missed. This has implications should a higher level commander or 
headquarters need to update the stand-in force (Builder et al., 1999). 
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VI. METHODOLOGY 
A. VIGNETTE DEVELOPMENT 
While there is a historical basis for EABO, there are few cases from modern warfare 
that can be utilized to describe the C2 challenges of EABO against peer competitors in a 
potentially degraded information environment. As such this research develops two 
vignettes based on concepts of employment found in the Tentative Manual for 
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (TMEABO). In order to limit the scope, this 
research examines the C2 challenges of fires in support of surface warfare and fires in 
support of air and missile defense. The vignettes examine plausible scenarios and the 
technological systems that will aid decision-makers when operating below the threshold of 
violence. In order to keep this at an unclassified level, the researcher is deliberately vague 
with the implementation, capabilities, and limitations with certain weapons and sensor 
systems. The purpose of this analysis is to use the OODA loop 2.0 to identify issues for 
consideration when developing C2 systems for EABO.  
B. APPROACH 
Each vignette includes an overview of the situation as well as purpose of the EAB. 
The vignettes describe the actual reality present in Oval 1 and then moves through the 
remainder of the OODA loop 2.0 in order to describe how aspects of that reality move 
throughout the system enabling the decision-maker to arrive at a decision. The initial 
iteration describes events in an uncontested information environment. Then, the vignette 
describes how progression changes based on a denied or degraded information 
environment. The analysis provides insight into the types of technologies required, specific 
data required, and the contents of the analysis and synthesis lenses required in order to 
reach a decision.  
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VII. ANALYSIS 
A. VIGNETTE 1: FIRES IN SUPPORT OF SURFACE WARFARE  
1. Background and Overview 
Stand-in forces conducting fires in support of surface warfare serve to counter 
adversary A2AD capabilities. By applying fires against surface targets, these EABs can 
help control or deny portions of the littoral operations area (LOA) (United States Marine 
Corps, 2021). Fires in support of surface warfare can be utilized to help ensure freedom of 
navigation throughout the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS). China 
continually engages in increasingly provocative actions to diminish the territorial claims 
of other countries and claims an overly expansive exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
(O’Rourke, 2021b). The use of the China Coast Guard (CCG) and People’s Armed Forces 
Maritime Militia (PAFMM) constitute a seemingly less menacing way to achieve the same 
ends. These vessels are able to operate under the guise of enforcing Chinese sovereignty 
while strong-arming other vessels out of the region (Department of Defense, 2020). The 
presence of fires EABs can impose greater costs on the Chinese by controlling portions of 
these disputed areas without the need to have U.S. surface vessels present within the 
Chinese WEZ. In short, the Chinese would be forced with the prospect of operating within 
the WEZ of U.S. forces should they wish to continue their salami-slicing actions. 
2. Observe 
In terms of surface warfare, Oval 1 consists of the ground truth regarding the vessels 
in the LOA. This includes elements such as nationality, type of vessel, purpose, and 
intentions. As described by O’Rourke (2021a) and the Department of Defense (2020) the 
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has the capability to employ a variety of vessels 
from Type 055 cruisers, Type 052 Destroyers, Type 054 Frigates, as well as amphibious 
vessels as well. Additionally, the CCG and PAFMM can operate in the LOA as well 
primarily to harass foreign vessels operating in the claimed EEZ. The variety of vessels in 
Oval 1 means that it would be important for Oval 2 to be able to differentiate between the 
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types of vessels as well as the analysis and synthesis lenses to possess information on the 
capabilities and limitations of the vessels. 
Oval 2 consists of those elements of the vessels in Oval 1 that can be sensed. Some 
of this data can be provided by a variety of sensors networked to the EAB. This includes 
active sensing capabilities like surveillance radar, manned platforms, and a variety of 
unmanned platforms (United States Marine Corps, 2021). These can include a variety of 
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) such as the MQ-4C Triton, unmanned surface vessels 
(USV) like Sea Hunter, and smaller organic UAS and USV (Galdorisi, 2021; Sussman, 
2020). As such, the employment closely resembles the depiction in Figure 24.  
 
Figure 24. Concept of employment in support of maritime fires. 
Source: United States Marine Corps (2021). 
One of the advantages of the JADC2 construct is that these sensor assets need not 
be organic to the EAB, but rather the EAB only requires network connectivity in order to 
retrieve the feeds from the appropriate system. The data connections could be made by 
satellite communication (SATCOM) or through advances in the mobile ad-hoc network 
(MANET) throughout the LOA (Bordetsky & Netzer, 2010). Through this network, surface 
71 
and airborne nodes, on manned and unmanned platforms, could create a resilient network 
throughout the area (Markray & Waller, 2018; Maupin, 2016). Network connectivity also 
enables access to systems such as the automatic identification system (AIS), so the EAB 
could use AIS data to help determine the identity and intentions of the vessel. 
The EAB’s communication capabilities are also a component of Oval 2 because it 
enables them to receive inputs sent via RF channels from other stand-in elements as well 
as higher headquarters. This suite could include high frequency (HF), very-high frequency 
(VHF), ultra-high frequency (UHF), SATCOM, as well as the previously mentioned data 
connections enabling it to be linked into the JADC2 cloud. By enabling multiple channels 
of communication, friendly forces could communicate in a variety of ways should one 
become inoperative. It also helps complicate adversary EMSO and distributes the 
bandwidth requirements across multiple systems. When taken together, the combination of 
sensing, networking, and communication capabilities creates an expanded Oval 2. This 
capability enables the EAB to pull more data from Oval 1. 
In this specific scenario, Oval 1 consists of a Renhai (Type 055) cruiser transiting 
at high speed to intercept a disabled U.S. survey vessel. Additionally, a flotilla of PAFMM 
vessels is transiting to contested fishing waters that are being utilized by third-country 
fishermen. Each of these vessels could be sensed by various unmanned systems in the 
surveillance area. Because of the robust sensing capability, Oval 2 could detect the cruiser 
as well as its direction and speed. The survey vessel could be detected via AIS and radio 
relays allowing the EAB to receive the radio messages sent via maritime distress 
frequencies. Oval 2 could detect the flotilla of fishing boats transiting towards the contested 
fishing area; however, there was not a way to directly sense whether or not they were 
PAFMM.  
Because these two situations are developing in different areas, it puts a limit on 
what can be perceived (Oval 4) at any given time. This limitation could be in part to display 
limitations. If the decision-maker only has the ability to display one feed at a time, they 
would be forced to rotate between feeds. Even if the decision-maker could monitor both at 
the same time, their attention would be split between the two developing situations. In 
either case, there would be elements from Oval 3 that did not progress to Oval 4. In this 
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case, the decision-maker can only monitor one situation. Given the mission of the EAB, 
their Lens A directs their attention towards the situation regarding the cruiser, so the 
decision-maker is no longer monitoring the PAFMM vessels.  
3. Orient 
In the case of the cruiser, the decision-maker’s Lens B would help provide meaning 
to the perceptions in order to comprehend what the cruiser was doing. The combination of 
perceptions allowed the decision-maker to comprehend that the cruiser was transiting to 
intercept the survey vessel. Because the decision-maker had a basic understanding of ship’s 
transit speeds, they concluded that the cruiser was transiting above a normal cruising speed. 
Because the survey vessel’s messages did not indicate any need for immediate assistance, 
the decision-maker concluded that the cruiser was trying to get there before U.S. vessels or 
assets could respond. 
Having come to this Oval 5 comprehension, analysis and synthesis Lens C provided 
more context that may project the intent of the vessel once it reaches the survey ship. 
Because the cruiser was not responding to the survey vessel over the maritime distress 
frequency, the decision-maker was concerned that they may have some nefarious intentions 
once they reach the vessel, especially because it was located in the expanded Chinese EEZ. 
Based on this Oval 6 projection, the decision-maker provided feedback to the observation 
phase to try and gain more information regarding movements of other Chinese assets.  
4. Decide and act 
Based on the orientation in Oval 6 of the cruiser, the decision-maker did not 
perceive the necessary hostile acts or hostile intents that would enable them to fire on the 
cruiser. However, the decision-maker put information into the environment (Oval 1) by 
reporting what they were seeing to the SUWC. This would enable higher echelons of 
command to sortie other assets to the area to assist. It would also give higher headquarters 
the opportunity to order the EAB to fire on the cruiser, based on their own analysis of the 
situation. As the situation continues to develop, the decision-maker can look for cues that 
could indicate any hostile acts or intents from the cruiser. 
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One’s decision and action would also be based on the methods at their disposal to 
alter their environment which come down to weapons and communication systems. A 
future fires EAB would likely deploy with the Navy Marine expeditionary ship interdiction 
system (NMESIS) providing an over-the-horizon targeting capability utilizing the naval 
strike missile (NSM) (Shelbourne, 2021; Wood, 2021). The NSM has a range of 
approximately 100 NM and “combines a GPS-aided multi-sensor navigation suite with an 
advanced dual-band imaging infrared seeker with autonomous target recognition for 
terminal guidance” (Scott, 2015). As depicted in Figure 24, this targeting information could 
be provided by the previously mentioned manned and unmanned sensor systems. While 
this system would enable the decision-maker to fire upon the cruiser, that is not yet the 
prudent course of action. As such, it is important for the EAB to communicate with higher 
headquarters to ensure more capable assets are able to respond to the situation. 
Communicating with adversaries can be viewed as a feasible action for scenarios 
that fall beneath the threshold of violence. In this case, if the decision-maker had the ability 
to do so, they could issue warnings to the cruiser to stay away from the survey vessel. This 
could serve to develop the situation further and help determine their intents. This also puts 
a C2 strain on the Chinese cruiser. Knowing that they are within the WEZ of a U.S. system 
may preclude them from taking aggressive actions. 
5. Time 
Time plays a factor in this situation because of the ability of friendly forces to 
respond. The decision-maker quickly needs orient on the situation and inform higher, so 
there is time for assets to be sortied and sent to the area. If the situation were to unfold 
close to the maximum sensing range or weapon’s range, time could be a constraint in that 
the decision-maker would need to act before the cruiser was out of range.  
6. Analysis and synthesis lenses 
The OODA loop 2.0 can help identify key information that must be present in the 
analysis and synthesis lenses in order to accomplish the mission. In this scenario, it is 
important that aspects of surface warfare be present in the analysis and synthesis lenses of 
the decision-maker. This is a more complex scenario than simply an ashore call for fire. In 
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this case one must contend with maritime laws and customs. It is also important that they 
receive updated command concepts and information on recent incidents with Chinese 
vessels in order to help the decision-maker drive perceptions, and apply meaning to those 
perceptions. If, for example, the decision-maker read an intelligence update that PLAN 
vessels directed to take aggressive actions against vessels in the EEZ, it would impact how 
they comprehended and projected the actions of that cruiser. 
One of the most important aspects of the analysis and synthesis lenses is the 
presence of mental models. This being a relatively new mission set, it would be important 
to instill mental models within the decision-maker’s lenses. This could be accomplished 
through training exercises designed to mimic adversary procedures.  
7. Contested Environment 
The Chinese possess a variety of methods to deny or degrade the information 
environment. This includes communications jamming and electronic countermeasures 
aircraft like the Y-9, and unmanned systems and surface vessels with similar capabilities 
(Department of Defense, 2020). These systems could be used to hinder feeds from 
unmanned systems as well as communications capabilities. Additionally, conventional 
Chinese assets could be utilized to destroy or disable unmanned systems serving as 
MANET nodes assets thereby reducing the effectiveness of the network. The bottom line 
is that these actions would shrink the capabilities of Oval 2 which can significantly limit 
the information available to the decision-maker.  
In this case, the Chinese damaged unmanned surface MANET nodes causing the 
EAB to lose their link to the JADC2 cloud. Additionally, a Y-9 in the region is jamming 
the EAB’s communication capabilities; however, the EAB is still able to receive it’s UAS 
feeds. 
With this reduction in Oval 2, the decision-maker could still perceive the Chinese 
cruiser as well as its speed and direction through the drone feed. However, because of the 
jammed communications and disabled network, the decision-maker cannot sense the 
disabled survey vessel. As such, from this incident, the cruiser transiting at higher speeds 
is the only item that becomes a perception. Using their knowledge of transit patterns, they 
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could comprehend they are traveling somewhere in a hurry, but they would have no idea 
why that would be. Based on the lack of contextual cues, it would be difficult to project 
anything besides that they will continue to transit (Oval 6). Thus, there is not really a 
decision to be made.  
Losing the ability to communicate is important because it prevents the EAB from 
informing the SUWC, and prevents the SUWC from issuing further direction to the EAB. 
Because communications are jammed, they would not be able to notify higher headquarters 
of the ship’s actions. This would prevent higher headquarters from sortieing assets to aid 
the survey vessel. It could also be possible that higher headquarters had different 
information at their disposal which indicated the cruiser having hostile intent. If it was the 
desire of the SUWC to have the EAB fire on the cruiser, they may not have had the 
capability to do so based on the jamming techniques. 
8. Summary 
From this vignette, it is clear that available technologies can create an expansive 
Oval 2 that can sense more of the environment in Oval 1 and provide the decision-maker 
with a variety of perceptions. But there still limits as to what can be sensed by even the 
most advanced platforms. The key component in this scenario is still the decision-maker’s 
ability to orient upon those perceptions in order to infer what the human operators of the 
vessel are doing or what they intent to do. Advanced sensing can aid this, but the 
components of the analysis and synthesis lenses are what enables the decision-maker to 
piece those perceptions together to formulate the SA and orientation. 
A communications denied or degraded environment would shrink Oval 2 in 
unpredictable ways, since the exact effects would be based on the specific electronic attack 
techniques utilized by the adversary. Having a limited capability to sense potential targets 
or receive targeting data, the EAB would have a limited capability to engage targets and 
fulfill their mission. If a decision-maker is not aware of their limitations in such a degraded 
environment, it is certainly possible for the right series of events to occur that certain 
perceptions align with a mental model that causes a decision-maker to arrive at a decision 
to fire when they should not, or failed to fire when they should. 
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B. VIGNETTE 2: AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE  
1. Background and overview 
In this instance, a littoral force is used to provide air and missile defense (AMD) 
against Chinese missile threats in the littoral operations area (LOA) (United States Marine 
Corps, 2021). This is an important mission because these longer range missile threats are 
the weapons that increase the size of the adversary WEZ. These weapons necessitate stand-
in forces because the missiles must be sensed and engaged as early as possible in order to 
mitigate their range and speed (Hughes & Girrier, 2018). Figure 25 illustrates how the use 
of AMD could be used to protect surface vessels. While not depicted in the figure, 
indications are that the Chinese would utilize volleys of missiles in order to overwhelm 
ships defenses (Gormley et al., 2014b). This includes deploying a variety of missiles with 
different flight profiles and speeds in order to strain defenses and limit the reaction time of 
the targeted vessels (Gormley et al., 2014a).  
 
Figure 25. Notional AMD EAB concept of employment. Source: 
United States Marine Corps (2021). 
The goal of these AMD EABs would be to reduce the effectiveness or destroy 
hostile air and missile threats (United States Marine Corps, 2021). While much attention is 
paid to the Chinese missile threat, it is also important to note that these EABs could play a 
critical role in addressing the Chinese air threat.  
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2. Observe 
Oval 1 could include ships or aircraft operating in the area capable of firing ASCM 
or other missiles. In this example Oval 1 consists of two Luyang III (Type 052D) destroyers 
as wells as three H-6Js bombers.  
Oval 2 would require the ability to sense those platforms as well was a missile 
launch from those platforms. While it is relatively easy to sense the platform, it is more 
difficult to determine when a missile has been launched (Brose, 2020). Most modern 
missiles utilize offboard targeting data and inertial navigation systems (INS), so one would 
not detect emissions from a fire control radar since it would not be in use (Heginbotham, 
2015). Space-based sensing systems are not designed to detect the launch-plumes of cruise 
missile engines and motors (Gormley et al., 2014b). It may be possible to detect the launch 
by detecting the infrared energy from the rocket motor through sensor systems similar to 
those on aircraft survivability equipment; however, the sensor would need to be close to 
the missile. The missiles could also be detected by radar; however, cruise missiles have a 
very small radar signature and when combined with supersonic speeds and very low 
altitudes, they can be difficult to detect (Gormley et al., 2014b). It is certainly possible to 
detect incoming missiles; however, as demonstrated, it is difficult to detect. Thus, of the 
data available in Oval 1, there is a very limited amount available to the decision-maker.  
The speed and range of adversary air and missile threats necessitates having a series 
of AMD EABs throughout the LOA that can leverage joint and organic sensors through 
the data sharing capabilities of JADC2 (United States Marine Corps, 2021). This expands 
the data available in Oval 2 and can potentially increase the decision-space of decision-
makers. For example, the launch could be detected by a more forward EAB, the data 
transmitted throughout the LOA, and a more rearward EAB, or even a surface vessel, could 
leverage the early warning to launch an interceptor. 
The challenge for the decision-maker is being able to display inputs from these data 
sources in a coherent manner (Oval 3). This is certainly possible; however, it requires 
thorough interoperability between platforms promised by JADC2. Based on the mission of 
AMD, the decision-maker’s analysis and synthesis lenses can focus their attention on 
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potential threats such as those displayed platforms that are known to be capable of carrying 
ASCM.  
3. Orientation 
From those perceived potential threats in Oval 4, the decision-maker would utilize 
their analysis and synthesis lenses to comprehend what the adversary ships and aircraft 
were doing (Oval 5) and project what they may do (Oval 6). This is one of the primary 
challenges of the orientation phase for the decision-maker because Chinese aircraft 
operating in the region is not necessarily an indication that they are about to launch a strike 
against U.S. forces. Thus, they can direct internal feedback to the observation phase to 
attempt to find other cues that could indicate hostile intent or hostile actions. This could 
include retrieving shared data from the environment to include hostilities in other areas of 
the AO, updated intelligence reports, or tracking other ship and aircraft activity outside of 
their LOA. In a networked environment, it could also include messaging forward sensor 
EABs to direct their attention to a certain area thus expanding and refining Oval 2 in the 
observation phase.  
When conducted and AMD EAB when operating below the threshold of violence, 
it is difficult to orient on the adversary. In the case of the three bombers, the decision-maker 
can use their analysis and synthesis lenses to recognize that the H-6J can carry six 
supersonic long-range YJ-12 ASCMs that are capable of reaching targets to the Second 
Island Chain (Department of Defense, 2020). When outfitted with its payload, these aircraft 
are certainly a threat; however, their mere presence does not constitute a hostile act or 
hostile intent that would warrant shooting them down prior to the H-6J firing first. The 
same could be said of the two destroyers, while an analysis and synthesis lens could tell 
the decision-maker that the Luyang III can carry the YJ-18 which in addition to being a 
long-range supersonic ASCM can rapidly maneuver at up to 10Gs in order to avoid 
interception, once again, their mere presence does not constitute hostile acts or intents 
(Heginbotham, 2015). 
Applied to the OODA loop 2.0, the presence of the platforms and their capabilities 
can be comprehended by the decision-maker in Oval 5. It is inherently difficult to judge 
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their future status because there are few indicators of a pending launch. Thus, the decision-
maker would likely need to continually monitor these platforms and wait for an overt sign 
of a hostile act or hostile intent. 
4. Decision and action 
In the case of a perceived missile launch, there is not much of a decision for the 
decision-maker to make. In this case, they would execute the fast reflexive thinking and 
immediately authorize the launch of an interceptor missile. The exception to this would be 
if they were able to detect a launch, but came to the quick orientation that the geometries 
were such that they could not fire to intercept the missile.  
It is more difficult to judge hostile intent and launch a pre-emptive attack which is 
one reason why constant connectivity to the Air and Missile Defense Commander (AMDC) 
would be important. In situations that may require pre-emption or even uncertainty, the 
decision-maker can push these questions to higher echelons of command and await their 
feedback. Pushing such scenarios to higher echelons also allows them to sortie friendly 
aircraft or utilize other assets to aid in the situation as well.  
Communicating with adversaries is also important in this scenario. It is an 
important action for a decision-maker to be able to warn adversary aircraft if they are 
conducting operations that appear to be threatening. Such warnings can allow the decision-
maker to ascertain the intentions of the adversary, and potentially expand their decision-
space. This too has a limit though. With most Chinese missiles having ranges in the 
hundreds of nautical miles, it is not reasonable to force adversary platforms to remain 
outside of the engagement envelope of these missiles.  
5. Feedback 
Feedback plays an important role in this scenario because as these situations 
develop, the decision-maker will have to constantly provide feedback to network and 
sensor systems in order to search for cues that would indicate hostile intent or hostile acts. 
It is also critical to provide feedback as data into Oval 1 so that other friendly assets can 
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access it through their Oval 2. This is especially important in the event of missile launch 
so that other assets in the LOA can respond as appropriate.  
6. Time 
Time is of paramount importance in this type of operation because of the speed at 
which ASCM travel. In the case of high supersonic and hypersonic missiles, not only is 
there limited time in order to perceive and act, but one must also do so in such a time that 
allows the intercepting missile to actually intercept the target. Thus, after missile launch, 
the OODA loop 2.0 must turn very quickly.  
Because of the need for rapidity, it is important that the interoperability and 
processing capabilities of all systems involved with this in mind. If data shared from other 
entities must go through time consuming processing, it could make a difference whether a 
missile is launched in time or not.  
7. Analysis and synthesis lenses 
It is important that decision-makers be intimately familiar with adversary weapons 
systems so that they can direct their attention (Lens A) appropriately and can correctly 
comprehend and project based on their observations. This systems knowledge when 
combined with knowledge of adversary tactics and the local context can develop and 
trigger mental models that will aid in comprehending and projecting what is occurring.  
This scenario also necessitates thorough command concepts and orders that cover 
contingencies to the best of planners’ abilities. This can provide direction to the decision-
maker when faced with some uncertainty.  
8. Contested Environment 
The ability to effectively conduct AMD can be severely impacted in a contested 
environment. While Oval 1 would remain the same, the ability to detect those actions in 
Oval 1 diminishes as Oval 2 shrinks. This can occur through adversary OIE that impact 
forward sensor EABs, network connectivity, communication from unmanned systems, the 
AMD EAB, etc.  
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For example, if one’s capacity to detect the destroyers and bombers is impacted 
(Oval 2) then the decision-maker could not perceive their presence and prime the system 
to look for cues of a launch. Without the ability to detect the platform, the first indications 
one may receive of the platform could be from launch indication sensors or the active 
homing of the missile itself, which would limit the decision-maker’s response capability.  
Conversely, if network connectivity between EABs was degraded, it would make 
it difficult to exchange data regarding launch indications. This would degrade the ability 
for forward EABs to push the data to more rearward EABs that could actually intercept the 
missile. Once again, if the decision-maker cannot perceive the launch data, they cannot 
take the necessary actions to intercept the missile. 
An environment where communications are impacted would prevent the decision-
maker from pushing requests for information and authority to fire up through the chain of 
command. Thus, they could be left to their own decision-making capacity based on the 
rules of engagement to fire.  
One of the benefits of JADC2 in this instance is that with systems being 
interconnected, another EAB or entity could continue the mission should one EAB be 
affected. In other words, redundancies in the system could allow other stand-in forces to 
receive the information. Geometries of fire can limit this in such a way that while those 
EABs could come to the correct orientation of what is going on, they may be powerless to 
take action because they are not in a position to intercept the missile.  
9. Analysis 
AMD EABs provide a valuable warning and defense capability given the threat of 
adversary missile systems. However, as this vignette demonstrates, this is not an easy 
mission. The OODA loop 2.0 helped illustrate the sensing limitations that make defending 
against extremely low altitude supersonic missiles difficult. These limited inputs make 
orientation difficult. One could correctly comprehend what is currently occurring in the 
environment (Oval 5), but it would be difficult to correctly project this comprehension into 
the future. As the vignette demonstrated, dangerous threat systems with ASCM loadouts 
could be operating in the environment, but there are relatively few cues that could lead to 
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an accurate projection that they intend to engage. This prospect becomes more daunting in 
a denied or degraded information environment as those few cues are no longer available 




VIII. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Boyd’s original OODA loop represented a way of thinking about thinking, and this 
research sought ways to update that manner of thinking in order to be effective in the 
current operating environment given the reliance on technological system. This is 
important because decision-making and the OODA loop are at the center of command and 
control. Despite the emphasis on technological systems, those systems exist to facilitate 
the flow of information to the decision-maker so that they can make a decision. Despite 
advances in sensor technology and networking, there are still limits to what can be sensed 
and present in Oval 2. While it is possible to sense tangible events and cues, it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to sense the intentions of platforms. The onus is still on the decision-
maker to fill these gaps through orientation. It is the decision-maker’s orientation that will 
determine whether ships and aircraft are merely harassing friendly forces or whether they 
actually have hostile intents.  
In the realm of competition, the link between observations and orientation becomes 
even more critical. As one’s networking and sensor capabilities increase, one can have 
more observations to feed orientation. However, simply because one has more observations 
does not equate to making a better decision. The key lays in the orientation phase where 
those perceptions are analyzed and synthesized in order to comprehend the situation and 
project the future status of those events. Given the composition of the analysis and 
synthesis lenses, different decision-makers my highlight certain perceptions and subsume 
others based on those traits, which can lead to varying comprehensions and projections.  
Technological systems impact decision-making by providing the cues and 
observations to the decision-making process; however, these systems have their limits. In 
an uncontested environment, modern networking and communications techniques leave 
the bounds of information sharing nearly limitless. While this is in keeping with the tenants 
of NWC, the decision-maker must be able to parse through the available data to determine 
what they actually perceive and what continues through the model. Just because it is 
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available does not mean it is perceived. The composition of one’s analysis and synthesis 
lenses affect what is perceived. When the information environment becomes contested, as 
OODA loop 2.0 demonstrates, the ability to extract information from the environment 
diminishes, sometimes in unpredictable ways. This limits the amount of data that can flow 
through the model and can lead to uncertainty. In the absence of information, the decision-
maker must fill those gaps in order to attempt to comprehend and project the environment.  
The decision-making models described in Chapter II are important to the study of 
command and control because such models attempt to illustrate how decision-makers 
determine what must be accomplished and see to its execution. Like Boyd, these theories 
emphasized the importance of orientation in its various forms, because it is that orientation 
that leads to decisions and actions. Several of the models discussed conceded that 
technological systems impacted the orientation process through the availability of 
environmental cues, but failed to delve into those specific impacts. In other words, the 
DMSC was one of the few models that directly addressed the impacts of technological 
systems to provide those cues.  
Most importantly, in EABO it is not enough to simply think of observations as an 
end product. Instead, observations are a process facilitated by technological systems as 
demonstrated by the OODA loop 2.0. The observation phase is a complex technical process 
involving the sensing and processing of the environments and displaying that to the 
decision-maker. This fidelity enables one to examine the data in the environment itself, the 
ability to sense the data, the ability to display the data or manipulations of the analysis and 
synthesis lenses in order to manipulate what is perceived by the decision-maker. The 
character of competition and warfare against peer competitors necessitates this level of 
fidelity. 
The researcher initially expected the analysis to show that technological systems 
shifted some of the importance of the orientation phase to the observation phase of the 
OODA loop. Instead, technological systems merely strengthen the relationship between 
observations and orientation, and perhaps even make orientation even more important. In 
fact, due to varying amounts of data available from Oval 2, orientation becomes even more 
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critical as a decision-maker must develop SA, in line with the true environment, when 
contending with a deluge of information as well as limited and degraded information. 
B. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS AND LIMITATIONS 
Due to the scope of this research, most of the emphasis on C2 systems focused on 
the technological aspect; however, the fact that technological systems encompass just one 
part of the overall C2 system cannot be overstated. In fact, it may be possible to compensate 
for the limitations of technological systems in a contested environment through thorough 
planning and contingencies. 
Because EABO are a relatively new concept that is still being tested, the greatest 
limitation of this research was the limit of historical case studies that capture both the 
technology and contested information environment that EABO are designed to operate 
within. This caused the researcher to expand upon concepts outlined in the TMEABO in 
order to develop the vignettes. While not ideal, the vignettes illustrated the validity of the 
model as well as points of contention within the operating concepts.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
OODA loop 2.0 can facilitate future studies in AI by analyzing where narrow AI 
outputs fit into the model to impact human decision-making in order to better align the 
human-machine team. If narrow AI and ML algorithms are to be used as decision aids, 
humans would still need to make the final decisions. If humans act in an on-the-loop 
capacity, that individual would conceivably need to come to some sort of orientation and 
decision in order to determine the best course of action: to approve the action or veto it. In 
doing so, OODA loop 2.0 can help expose issues in C2 systems to be addressed either 
through organizational structures or procedures in order to make best use of the technology.  
It is not only important to exercise the concepts within the TMEABO but those 
exercises must strain the decision-making capability of the decision-maker. OODA loop 
2.0 could be used to help design those exercises by identifying how to manipulate the 
environment. This could include utilizing OIE to impact observations by manipulating 
Ovals 1–3, the analysis and synthesis lenses, and the ability to receive feedback. Examining 
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these can expose the needs for other sensor capabilities and weapons capabilities that may 
increase a decision-maker’s decision space. Results from these exercises could also drive 
the need for organizational or procedural changes that are designed to mitigate the effects 
of a contested information environment.  
OODA loop 2.0 provides an expanded and more tangible view of the traits present 
within the orientation phase through the analysis and synthesis lenses. Future work can be 
conducted in order to determine what needs to be present in the decision-maker’s analysis 
and synthesis lenses for EABO mission sets. For example, if Marines are to conduct fires 
in support of surface warfare, how much resident knowledge must they possess regarding 
surface warfare and naval tactics? This could result in organizational adjustments such as 
providing the stand-in force with an on-sight naval liaison in order to provide some of that 
knowledge. 
The Naval Postgraduate School Center for Network Experimentation (CENETIX) 
could utilize this model to design experiments utilizing the networking technology 
previously discussed during an experiment. For example, a MANET network could be 
constructed and then degraded utilizing a variety of jamming and interference techniques. 
This would create an environment of variable Oval 2s from which decision-makers could 
be driven to make decisions. This could help determine not only the effectiveness of 
decision-making under such conditions, but also help determine what data points are the 
critical ones that helped make decisions.  
While the vignettes go into a few examples of EABO, the reality is that when 
utilized there will be varying types of EABs across the LOA that, in an uncontested 
environment, would be networked with Naval forces as well as those from the Army and 
Air Force. This is what JADC2 envisions. What comes out of this research though is a need 
to address issues of shared situation awareness, and how, when using this model, decision-
makers interact with other decision-makers in the LOA. If one assumes that the 
components of a Marine’s analysis and synthesis lenses are different from a surface warfare 
officer or an Air Force pilot, then by extension their orientation’s may differ.  
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